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An existential second-order logic sentence has the formwhere each $R_i$ is a second-order relation variable of fixed finite arity $k_i$ and $\phi$ is a first-order sentence over the input first-order signature expanded by the $R_i$. The first-order sentence may contain both universal quantification and existential quantification over individuals; only the outer quantification over second-order relation variables is required to be existential. Under full semantics for second-order logic, truth means that some expansion by witness relations satisfies $\phi$.

For a fixed existential second-order logic sentence on a domain of cardinality $n$, the witnesses need ${\sum }_{i=1}^m{n}^{k_i}$ membership bits. The arities and the number of witnesses are constants because the sentence is fixed. After guessing those bits, a verifier evaluates the fixed first-order sentence by enumerating assignments to its finitely many individual variables, taking polynomial time. In the second-order encoding of three-colorability, the three witnesses require $3n$ bits, and the edge constraints can be checked over at most $n^2$ ordered vertex pairs. This is the logical form of the NP principle that a positive answer has a short complexity certificate.

The fixed-sentence qualification matters: it is the input first-order structure that varies, rather than an arbitrarily large formula supplied with each input. Fagin's theorem states the converse as well: every isomorphism-invariant NP property of finite relational first-order structures has such a description. The coloring example uses only unary second-order relation variables; the general theorem allows any fixed finite arities.

Fix a finite relational first-order signature $\tau$, and let $\mathcal{K}$ be a class of finite nonempty $\tau$-first-order structures closed under isomorphism. Fagin's theorem states that $\mathcal{K}$ is definable by one existential second-order logic sentence under full semantics for second-order logic if and only if its language of standard finite encodings belongs to NP. A standard encoding numbers the domain $\{0,\dots ,n-1\}$ and lists membership bits for each input relation, together with $n$; take an explicit encoding whose length is at least $n$. The encoding language contains all numbered copies of members of $\mathcal{K}$, with malformed encodings rejected. The isomorphism condition makes membership a property of the structure rather than an arbitrary choice of labels. Changing between the usual explicit encodings preserves the NP characterization by polynomial time translations.

The forward direction is the witness-and-verifier calculation in existential second-order logic. For the reverse direction, the guiding idea is to encode an accepting nondeterministic computation using second-order relation variables: fixed-length tuples of domain elements index enough time steps and storage positions for a polynomial time computation. A first-order sentence checks the initial input, legal transitions, and acceptance. The number of tuples grows with the input, although the checking sentence stays fixed. No total order must be supplied as part of the input first-order signature: an auxiliary total order can itself be existentially guessed and constrained by a first-order sentence. Isomorphism invariance ensures that a change of this auxiliary numbering does not change membership in $\mathcal{K}$.

The second-order encoding of three-colorability is a small instance of the forward direction. The beauty of Fagin's theorem is the complete correspondence: the computational class NP can be characterized by the shape of a logical description, without mentioning a particular machine in the statement. The scope is finite relational first-order structures and fixed sentences; it is not a claim about deciding arbitrary second-order logic sentences or about arbitrary infinite domains.

Ronald Fagin published the result in Generalized First-Order Spectra and Polynomial-Time Recognizable Sets, SIAM-AMS Proceedings 7 (1974), pp. 43–73, Section 4. The original paper frames the correspondence using classes of finite expansions and their encodings. Fagin's author-maintained publication list explains that the abstract in the available copy was added in 2019; its modern summary should therefore not be mistaken for part of the 1974 printing.

Fagin's theorem states that, for a finite relational signature, an isomorphism-invariant class of finite structures has its standard encoding language in NP if and only if it is definable by an existential second-order logic sentencewhere $\psi$ is first-order and the relation variables have fixed finite arities. The forward implication includes the substantive encoding of a polynomially bounded accepting computation by relations. In the reverse implication the relations are polynomial-length certificates and the fixed first-order sentence can be checked in polynomial time. This is a finite-structure characterization; no order need be named in the input signature.

Here equivalence means equivalence on all finite structures of the chosen signature, and an existential sentence means an existential second-order sentence. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that P equals NP. We use that P is closed under complementation, that fixed first-order model checking is polynomial-time, and that guessing a polynomial-length string followed by a polynomial-time test is in NP.

Under this equality, evaluating any fixed second-order logic sentence is in P. Prove this by induction through its quantifiers and Boolean operations. The first-order part is already polynomial-time. If an inner formula can be evaluated in P, existentially quantifying a relation of fixed arity guesses at most $n^k$ bits and then performs the inner polynomial-time test. This gives an NP procedure and hence, under the assumption, a P procedure. A universal relation quantifier is handled by complementing the corresponding existential test. Boolean combinations remain polynomial-time as well. A fixed formula has only finitely many such steps and fixed arities, so the resulting time bound is polynomial.

Consequently every second-order definable class lies in P, hence in NP. By Fagin's theorem it has an equivalent existential second-order sentence. This contradicts the posited second-order sentence with no such equivalent. ThereforeThe proof uses the equality assumption to collapse quantifier alternation; it does not assume an unproved strictness statement about the polynomial hierarchy.

Every fixed second-order logic sentence is evaluable in PSPACE. On a universe of size $n$, a relation of arity $k$ is stored using $n^k$ bits. Enumerate its possible interpretations with a counter of the same polynomial length, recursively evaluate the inner formula and reuse the storage. Universal quantifiers require checking all interpretations; existential ones stop at the first success. The fixed quantifier depth and fixed arities bound total space by a polynomial, even though time can be exponential. First-order quantifiers and Boolean operations require no larger bound.

If $NP=PSPACE$, this places the class defined by the assumed second-order sentence in NP. Fagin's theorem would give an equivalent existential second-order sentence, again contradicting the hypothesis. HenceFor completeness, $NP\subseteq PSPACE$: a polynomial-time nondeterministic computation can be searched deterministically depth first, retaining a polynomial-length computation branch and reusing space. Thus the inequality is a strict containment under the stated hypothesis.