Solution (source code)

= Solution

When both consumers have the same <quasilinear utility> on $(0,\infty)\times\mathbb R$, the same strictly concave one-variable maximization gives $x_1=x_2=1/p$, independently of their wealth. If their first-good endowments are $a,b$, then
$$
Z(p,t)=\frac2p-(a+b),\qquad Z_p(p,t)=-\frac2{p^2}\ne0.
$$
Thus \b[the joint regular-value condition always holds]. With positive total first-good endowment, the equilibrium is
$$
\boxed{p^*=\frac2{a+b},\qquad Z_p(p^*,t)=-\frac{(a+b)^2}{2}<0.}
$$
Both first-good markets and second-good markets clear: second-good demands sum to $p^*(a+b)+t+c-2=t+c$. If a nonstandard endowment choice has $a+b\leq0$, there is no positive-price zero, so the <regular value> condition is vacuous. In the usual positive-endowment case every parameter has the displayed unique <regular exchange economy>.