= Solution
A buyer accepts a <posted price> precisely when their valuation exceeds it; equality has probability zero. The independent uniform valuations therefore give probability $p^2$ that neither accepts, for $0\leq p\leq1$. The seller's <expected revenue> is
$$
R_a(p)=p(1-p^2),\qquad R_a'(p)=1-3p^2.
$$
The interior critical point is $p=1/\sqrt3$, with negative second derivative; the endpoint revenues are zero. Prices above one make no sale and nonpositive prices cannot improve on this positive optimum. Hence
$$
\boxed{p_*=\frac1{\sqrt3},\qquad R_a^*=\frac{2}{3\sqrt3}.}
$$
Which willing buyer is served if both accept does not affect this revenue.
Back to article page