Solution (source code)

= Solution

In an ideal continuous-price <English auction>, staying active until one's private valuation is optimal: dropping earlier can forgo positive surplus, while staying later risks paying more than the car is worth. The highest-valued buyer therefore wins, paying the price at which the other buyer drops out, namely $\min(V_1,V_2)$.

For $0\leq t\leq1$, independence gives $\Pr(\min(V_1,V_2)>t)=(1-t)^2$. Integrating this tail probability gives
$$
\boxed{R_b=\mathbb E\min(V_1,V_2)=\int_0^1(1-t)^2\,dt=\frac13.}
$$
“Pays his bid” in this ascending auction does not mean that the winning buyer pays his full valuation; the competing buyer's dropout determines the winning price.