= Solution
\b[English law in 1867 fixed no maximum period of proved non-intercourse compatible with legitimacy; an exceptional interval had to be assessed on the evidence of possible <gestation> in the particular case.] The relevant interval runs from the last possible intercourse between the spouses to the child's birth. Proof of subsequent non-intercourse establishes that interval; it does not itself establish how long <pregnancy> could have lasted.
The contemporary eighth edition of the <Encyclopædia Britannica>, published in 1853–1860, expressly distinguished the English position from numerical limits in continental codes. Its article on <forensic medicine> states: “The law of England at present has no definite limit”; it then says that a case beyond the usual term would go to a jury. This directly answers the legal question: there was no prescribed number of days that resolved every case. Medical evidence about the credibility of the claimed <gestation> informed the tribunal's decision about the child's status.<Medical Jurisprudence in the eighth edition of Encyclopædia Britannica>[Part I, Section I, VI.3, “Limits of Utero-gestation”: English law has no definite limit; a case beyond the usual term would go to a jury]{ref}
To see what “consistent” means, distinguish the ordinary duration of <pregnancy>, the range alleged in exceptional medical reports, and a legal decision about a particular child. An accepted exceptional interval would show that the ordinary duration was not an inflexible rule; it would not establish a maximum for every subsequent case. For illustration, the later historical account in <Legal medicine by Charles Meymott Tidy (volume 3)> reports an English decision, dated there to 1834, allowing legitimacy after about 42 weeks, or 294 days, from last intercourse. This is a retrospective textbook report, not independent verification of the original judgment or proof of a longest accepted interval. The legal answer rests on the contemporary statement of the English rule, rather than on that numerical example.<Legal medicine by Charles Meymott Tidy (volume 3)>[pp.59–60, tabulated 294-day interval and case 112 (1834); retrospective account published in 1884]{ref}
The medical evidence also requires care over the starting event. A period counted from the last <menstruation> is not the same measurement as a period counted from intercourse, and neither directly observes the instant of <fertilization>. Modern <gestational age> conventionally counts from the first day of the last menstrual period; early <ultrasonography> provides a more accurate check than menstrual recall alone. It would be misleading to combine historical figures with these different starting points into a single supposedly proved maximum.<Methods for Estimating the Due Date by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists>[Committee Opinion No.700, “Clinical Considerations in the First Trimester” and “Last Menstrual Period”]{ref}
The absence of a predetermined English maximum did not make every length of separation legally acceptable or biologically possible. A claimed prolonged <pregnancy> still required credible evidence, and a nineteenth-century finding about legitimacy does not validate an extraordinary <pregnancy> length as a modern scientific observation. In <historical legitimacy and prolonged gestation>, the legal rule, the determination in an individual case, and the observed biological interval must be kept distinct. Establishing a unique longest reported case is a separate historical inquiry; it is not necessary to answer that English law prescribed no fixed maximum.
Back to article page
