= Solution
<Falsificationism> gives an attractive account of one aspect of <scientific progress>: replace protected dogma by conjectures that make risky claims and expose them to serious tests. From $T\land A\Rightarrow E$ and an accepted $\neg E$, <deduction> rules out the conjunction. A theory that accommodates every possible outcome supplies less opportunity to learn from error. <Karl Popper> emphasizes exposure to refutation and warns against treating any convenient supporting instance as a demanding test.<Science: Conjectures and Refutations by Karl Popper>[chapter 1 excerpt, risky prediction and refutability]{ref}
This captures why a successful novel prediction can be more informative than retrospectively adjusting a model to its original fitting data. It also helps articulate a progressive replacement: the new account should address the earlier successes and the discrepancy, while exposing itself to further independent tests. Merely adding a freely adjustable parameter after each failure need not improve knowledge.
The <Duhem problem> limits the simple account. A failed prediction is a failure of a package containing initial conditions, instrument assumptions and background theory. It is not a deductive identification of the particular target theory as false. Revising an <auxiliary hypothesis> can be rational when independently supported, but an unconstrained rescue can frustrate testing. Methodological judgement is needed to distinguish them; the bare logic of <falsifiability> does not do all the work.
There is also a positive-warrant problem. A theory's survival of past tests does not deductively entail that it will succeed tomorrow. Calling it corroborated records its demanding test history, but does not by itself solve the <problem of induction>. Nor does the elimination of one theory guarantee that a chosen rival is closer to the truth: many alternatives may remain, and progress can involve improved measurement, new concepts or increased explanatory scope as well as refutation.
A convincing form of <falsificationism> is therefore a critical methodology within a broader account. It explains the value of error detection, risky commitments and resistance to immunizing manoeuvres. It becomes less convincing as a complete logical algorithm for identifying falsified theories, ranking every successor or deriving confidence about future performance. A more adequate account combines severe criticism with independent checks on assumptions, comparative success and explicit acknowledgement of fallible inference.
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