The matrices obey , so both players' pure best response vectors have the form against opponent mixture . Against pure actions , the unique best responses are respectively . This three-cycle has no mutual best-response pair, so there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
In a game satisfying nondegeneracy of a bimatrix game, the two equilibrium strategy supports have equal cardinality: each support consists of best responses to the other strategy, so each size is at most the other. If both supports have size three, must have all coordinates equal. The first-minus-second and second-minus-third equations imply
This has no fully positive simplex solution. Thus both supports have size two.
For full support enumeration for a bimatrix game, denote the three possible supports by . On equal supports and , indifference requires respectively probabilities and , so those pairs fail. Equal support gives , whose omitted-action payoff is . The cross pair yields
with and . Thus the supported actions are best responses. Its reversed pair is also an equilibrium. The remaining unordered cross pairs fail: for the necessary gives , so the opponent has a profitable action outside its support. For , the necessary opponent mixture on is , which is infeasible. Reversing either failed pair cannot rescue it.
Hence all three equilibria are
Their payoffs are respectively , and . The support-size argument and exhaustion above rule out every other equilibrium.
Enumerate pairs of strategy supports, solve the equations making each supported action indifferent, then check strict positivity of supported probabilities and all omitted-action payoff inequalities. These conditions suffice for a Nash equilibrium. Under nondegeneracy of a bimatrix game, only pairs of equal support size need be tested.