For a bimatrix game with row and column payoff matrices , an equilibrium pair is a pair of mixed strategies for which neither player gains by a unilateral change:
This is a Nash equilibrium, or mutual best response pair. Every finite game with nonempty finite pure-strategy sets has at least one mixed-strategy equilibrium by Nash's theorem. Equivalently, the strategy domains are compact convex probability simplexes and the expected payoffs are continuous and linear in each player's own strategy. The existence assertion need not hold if only pure strategies are allowed.
Write the probability vectors in the order Bach, Mozart, Schubert. Against the row player's three pure-action payoffs are
Against the column player's payoffs are
A supported action must attain the corresponding maximum, and an omitted action must give no larger payoff.
We first justify that both players have the same support of a mixed strategy, rather than assume it. Each player's maximum payoff is strictly positive for every opponent probability vector. Thus implies , implies , and is equivalent to . If but , then either , making Mozart's payoff strictly exceed Bach's , or , making Bach's payoff zero and Schubert's positive. Both contradict best response. Therefore also implies . Similarly, if but , then makes the column payoff for Bach exceed Mozart's , or makes Mozart's payoff zero and Schubert's positive. Thus implies . The supports coincide, and there are only seven nonempty possibilities.
For singleton supports the three matching pure pairs are equilibria. For each two-element support, solve the two players' indifference equations and normalize their probabilities. For example, on Bach–Mozart, the equations are and , giving and . On Bach–Schubert they are and . On Mozart–Schubert they are and . In each case the omitted action gives strictly less than the common supported payoff.
For full support, the row indifference equations give and ; the column equations give and . Normalization determines the remaining pair. The full list, with row strategy first, is
All displayed supported probabilities are positive. The supported payoff pairs in the four nonpure cases are respectively , , and ; these values also verify the omitted-action inequalities directly. The common-support argument excludes every other support pair, and each indifference system has a unique solution. Hence there are exactly seven equilibrium pairs, three pure and four genuinely mixed. This is a complete support enumeration for a bimatrix game, not just a list of selected equilibria.
The matrices obey , so both players' pure best response vectors have the form against opponent mixture . Against pure actions , the unique best responses are respectively . This three-cycle has no mutual best-response pair, so there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
In a game satisfying nondegeneracy of a bimatrix game, the two equilibrium strategy supports have equal cardinality: each support consists of best responses to the other strategy, so each size is at most the other. If both supports have size three, must have all coordinates equal. The first-minus-second and second-minus-third equations imply
This has no fully positive simplex solution. Thus both supports have size two.
For full support enumeration for a bimatrix game, denote the three possible supports by . On equal supports and , indifference requires respectively probabilities and , so those pairs fail. Equal support gives , whose omitted-action payoff is . The cross pair yields
with and . Thus the supported actions are best responses. Its reversed pair is also an equilibrium. The remaining unordered cross pairs fail: for the necessary gives , so the opponent has a profitable action outside its support. For , the necessary opponent mixture on is , which is infeasible. Reversing either failed pair cannot rescue it.
Hence all three equilibria are
Their payoffs are respectively , and . The support-size argument and exhaustion above rule out every other equilibrium.
Read the lower-left entry of each cell as player 1's payoff and the upper-right entry as player 2's payoff, as indicated by the source diagram. Against , player 1 strictly prefers because ; against , player 1 strictly prefers because . Against , player 2 strictly prefers because ; against , player 2 strictly prefers because . Thus the pure strategy Nash equilibria are
For a fully mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, write and . Player 1's expected payoffs from the two pure strategies are
Equality, required when both pure strategies have positive probability, gives
Player 2's corresponding expected payoffs are
so equality gives
Both probabilities lie strictly between zero and one. Hence the unique fully mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is
with complementary probabilities on and . Its expected payoffs are
These are all three Nash equilibria. There are no equilibria with just one player genuinely mixing: against each opposing pure strategy, the other player's best response is unique, so that player cannot mix. When both players mix, the two linear indifference equations have the unique solution just obtained. This is support enumeration for a bimatrix game with all possible supports checked.