 Finite-horizon bargaining parity effect

In finite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining, the proposer with $k$ rounds left retains fraction $P_k$ of the currently available pie. Terminal acceptance gives $P_1=1$. After rejection, the responder becomes proposer and can obtain fraction $\alpha P_{k-1}$ of the current pie. The continuous-offer bargaining acceptance lemma therefore gives $P_k=1-\alpha P_{k-1}$. Summing the resulting finite geometric series proves the displayed formula.

Odd horizons give shares above $1/(1+\alpha )$, decreasing toward it; even horizons give shares below it, increasing toward it. Between two available horizons $k_1<k_2$, choose $k_1$ if $k_1$ is odd and $k_2$ if $k_1$ is even. This concerns the initial proposer and immediate agreement, rather than waiting until the selected final round to obtain its share.