Let
Q be annual emissions abatement in
tonnes per
year. The given marginal abatement cost is
MAC(Q)=1010200QUSDtonne−1.
Under the stipulated global, stationary, unconstrained cost-benefit
model, the optimal interior abatement equates that marginal cost to the avoided marginal damage of approximately
166.7USD per
tonne. Thus
Q∗≃8.33×109tonnesyear−1.
Total
mitigation expenditure is the
area under the marginal-cost
curve, not its endpoint value
times all abated
tonnes:
C(Q∗)=∫0Q∗MAC(Q)dQ=21(166.7)Q∗≃6.94×1011USDyear−1.
The result also presumes baseline emissions permit this much reduction. Rational policy need not reproduce it: different
discounting, damage
uncertainty and
risk aversion, income
weights, omitted
ecosystem impacts,
adaptation and local air-quality benefits alter valued benefits;
technology learning and adjustment constraints alter costs. Separate rational
governments may abate less because some benefits accrue abroad, while cooperative policy can internalize those benefits. Future
climate or
technology changes also undermine
a fixed
present marginal-damage
curve. These are changes in the
optimization problem, not
evidence of irrational decision-makers.