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Elliot Anshelevich studies algorithms for networks with decentralized or strategic decision makers. His institutional research description includes network formation, algorithmic game theory, approximation algorithms and computational questions about collective choice.^[ref]

He is a coauthor of The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation by Elliot Anshelevich and others. The paper asks how good the best stable network can be when each user can individually change routes and shared edge costs are divided among their users. This separates the best equilibrium's cost from the worst equilibrium's cost, formalized by price of stability and price of anarchy.^[ref]

The question is useful for a designer who can recommend a network but cannot prevent unilateral departures. A low-cost recommendation is sustainable only if no user can improve by leaving it; computing a cheap network and understanding its incentives are therefore different parts of the problem.

By Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Éva Tardos, Tom Wexler.

Theory of Computing 4 (2008), 77–109; published 4 August 2008; DOI 10.4086/toc.2008.v004a004. Abstract: strategic connection game and approximate equilibria. Primary author biographies and identified portraits: toc.cs.uchicago.edu/articles/v004a004/about.html .

By Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Jon Kleinberg, Éva Tardos, Tom Wexler, Tim Roughgarden.

Author-hosted manuscript dated 17 June 2004. Introduction defines the cost ratio for the best Nash equilibrium and explains the stable-recommendation interpretation.