Exponential-utility risk sharing ($\Gamma =({\sum }_j{\gamma }_j^{-1}{)}^{-1}$)

With positive welfare weights $a_j$, maximize ${\sum }_j{a}_j{\beta }_j^t[-e^{-{\gamma }_j{c}_j}/{\gamma }_j]$ subject to ${\sum }_j{c}_j=d$. Interior first-order conditions give $a_j{\beta }_j^t{e}^{-{\gamma }_j{c}_j}=\nu$. Put $\Gamma =({\sum }_j{\gamma }_j^{-1}{)}^{-1}$, $\log \bar{\beta }=\Gamma {\sum }_j{\gamma }_j^{-1}\log {\beta }_j$ and $\log A=\Gamma {\sum }_j{\gamma }_j^{-1}\log a_j$. ThenIf consumption must be nonnegative, the interior formula is replaced by $c_j=\max \{0,(\log a_j+t\log {\beta }_j-\log \nu )/{\gamma }_j\}$, with $\nu$ determined by resource clearing. These are Pareto allocations; realizing them as a competitive equilibrium with one productive asset requires feasible financing. For common ${\beta }_j=\beta$ and initial ownership $\Gamma /{\gamma }_j$, constant holdings and $C_t^j=(\Gamma /{\gamma }_j)d_t$ give such an equilibrium whenever fundamental prices and the utility sums are finite.