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Alfred J. Menezes coauthored the Handbook of Applied Cryptography by Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone. Its number-theoretic algorithms include computing modular square roots and implementing public-key cryptography. The presentation distinguishes computational problems, algorithmic procedures and correctness conditions, which is essential when a plausible-looking arithmetic operation is not by itself a secure cryptographic construction. ^[ref]

Paul C. van Oorschot coauthored the Handbook of Applied Cryptography by Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone. Its treatment connects cryptographic constructions with explicit mathematical algorithms and stated assumptions, rather than describing encryption only as a black box. The number-theoretic chapter includes algorithms for modular square roots, while the public-key chapter gives RSA cryptosystem and Rabin cryptosystem constructions.^[ref]

For a concrete special case, if $p\equiv 3(\mathrm{mod}4)$ is prime and $a$ is a nonzero square modulo $p$, a square root is $a^{(p+1)/4}\mathrm{mod}p$. This illustrates how assumptions on an integer modulus determine which algorithm and correctness argument apply.

The Rabin cryptosystem uses modular squaring with public modulus $N=pq$, where $p$ and $q$ are distinct odd prime numbers kept secret. The raw encryption map sends a message representative $m$ toKnowing the prime factorization lets the receiver compute modular square roots modulo each prime and combine them by the Chinese remainder theorem. For a message coprime to $N$, its ciphertext has exactly four roots modulo $N$, corresponding to the two sign choices modulo each prime. A full encryption scheme therefore needs a specified message encoding or other rule to select the intended root; raw modular squaring by itself is four-to-one on the units.^[ref]

For example, $N=7\cdot 11=77$ and $m=10$ give $c=23$. Its four roots are $10,32,45,67$ modulo $77$. The relation to integer factorization is especially direct: two roots that differ by more than an overall sign reveal a nontrivial factor through a greatest common divisor. The Rabin-Williams scheme is a more specific variant, rather than another name for every Rabin cryptosystem.

The Rabin-Williams scheme is a family of modified Rabin cryptosystem constructions using a modulus $N=pq$ with distinct prime numbers $p\equiv 3(\mathrm{mod}8)$ and $q\equiv 7(\mathrm{mod}8)$. These congruences make sign and doubling adjustments useful for producing quadratic residues before taking modular square roots. In signature variants, the private integer factorization permits root extraction while the public verification uses squaring.

The arithmetic mechanism can be seen without fixing a full message encoding. For a unit $h$ modulo $N$, exactly one of $h,-h,2h,-2h$ is a quadratic residue modulo both primes: the two signs change both Legendre symbols, while multiplication by $2$ changes only one of them. For the toy modulus $77=11\cdot 7$ and $h=5$, the adjustment $-2h\equiv 67$ has square root $12$, since $12^2\equiv 67(\mathrm{mod}77)$.

A complete digital signature scheme must additionally specify message hashing or redundancy, the selected root, and how the adjustment is encoded and verified. The congruence calculation alone is not such a scheme. A specific modified-Rabin message-recovery construction is given in the primary handbook, rather than being identical to raw four-root Rabin encryption.^[ref]

In the two-prime RSA cryptosystem, choose distinct odd prime numbers $p,q$, set $N=pq$, and choose an integer $1<e<\phi (N)$ coprime to $\phi (N)=(p-1)(q-1)$. A private exponent $d$ satisfies $ed\equiv 1(\mathrm{mod}\phi (N))$. The public key is $(N,e)$; the private key permits the inverse modular exponentiation. For a message representative $0\le m<N$,Correctness holds even when $m$ is not coprime to $N$: modulo each prime the zero case is immediate, while the nonzero case follows from Fermat's little theorem; the Chinese remainder theorem recombines the two congruences.

For example, $p=5$, $q=11$, $e=3$ and $d=27$ give $ed\equiv 1(\mathrm{mod}40)$; $m=2$ encrypts to $c=8$ and decrypts back to $2$. These tiny parameters only illustrate the arithmetic. The raw deterministic exponentiation is textbook RSA; practical encryption uses an encoding scheme rather than encrypting an unencoded message directly.^[ref]

Scott A. Vanstone coauthored the Handbook of Applied Cryptography by Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone. The book develops the mathematics and algorithms underlying cryptography, including modular square roots and number-theoretic computational problems. It makes explicit the distinction between an algorithm's mathematical correctness and the hardness assumptions used by a cryptographic system. ^[ref]

Symmetric-key cryptography uses shared secret key material for cryptographic operations, including encryption and authentication. In a symmetric encryption scheme, a recipient holding the secret key can recover the plaintext from a ciphertext. Keeping the algorithm public does not prevent security: the secret is the key, not the procedure.

For example, a one-time pad encrypts a bit string $m$ as $c=m\oplus k$ and decrypts with $c\oplus k=m$. Perfect secrecy requires an independently uniform secret key as long as the message and never reused. Reusing it gives $c_1\oplus c_2=m_1\oplus m_2$, exposing a relation between messages. Ordinary efficient symmetric ciphers instead offer computational guarantees under stated assumptions. Confidentiality alone does not ensure message integrity; authenticated encryption addresses both.^[ref]

The Tonelli-Shanks algorithm finds a square root of a quadratic residue $a$ modulo an odd prime number $p$. Handle $a=0$ separately and use the Legendre symbol to reject a quadratic nonresidue. Write $p-1=2^{s}q$ with $q$ odd, choose a quadratic nonresidue $z$, and initializemodulo $p$. Maintain $r^2=at$, with $c$ of multiplicative order $2^m$ and $t$ of multiplicative order dividing $2^{m-1}$.

If $t\ne 1$, find the least $i$ with $t^{2^i}=1$. Set $b=c^{2^{m-i-1}}$ and updateThe multiplicative order of $t$ decreases because its last nontrivial power and that of $b^2$ are both minus one. Thus $m$ strictly decreases. At $t=1$, the invariant gives $r^2=a$.

For $p=13,a=10,z=2$, initialization gives $(c,t,r,m)=(8,12,9,2)$. One update gives $r=7,t=1$, so the roots are $7$ and $6$ modulo thirteen.^[ref]