Computational-basis intercept-resend attack 2026-10-24
Measuring the transmitted qubit in the computational basis and forwarding its measured state produces a dephasing channel for users who do not know the outcome. For a Bell state , the reduced state becomes . It retains perfect anticorrelation while destroying correlation. Thus a single perfectly correlated key basis need not reveal an intercept-resend attack; incompatible-basis correlation tests can.
Past exam of the quantum information course of the University of Cambridge 2015 Paper 1 2 d Solution 2026-10-20
Let Eve obtain . Applying part (b) to her axes gives . Conditional on these rank-one local measurements, the forwarded particles are a product state with individual spin directions and . HenceConditional independence gives the product of these means. Averaging over Eve's outcomes,The sum is , soEve has turned the entangled source into an ensemble of product states by an intercept-resend attack. Ignoring her records does not restore the original singlet coherence.
Planar two-sided intercept-resend CHSH bound Created 2026-10-20 Updated 2026-10-24
Use Alice's CHSH axes and Bob's , with sign pattern . If Eve measures both singlet particles along planar angles , the intercept-resend attack correlation gives . Consequently . Randomly mixing axes independently of the users' secret settings preserves this interval by averaging. The bound is specific to these settings and this attack, rather than a general security theorem.