Write for the two simple hypotheses, with prior probabilities and densities . Under zero-one loss, the posterior expected losses of choosing and are respectively the posterior probabilities of and . A Bayes decision rule therefore chooses if
chooses for the reverse inequality, and may randomize at equality. With positive priors this is a likelihood-ratio test with cutoff .
For a test , its prior risk is . Choose and boundary randomization so that the likelihood-ratio test has size , and choose priors with ratio . Equivalence of normal and extensive analyses makes the pointwise posterior minimizer minimize this prior risk over all randomized tests. Thus for any ,
This proves the Neyman-Pearson lemma: a likelihood-ratio test of size has greatest power among tests of size at most . Such a cutoff and randomization come from a quantile of the likelihood ratio under ; always reject where . Endpoint cutoffs are handled directly or by their limiting rules.
For the remaining assertions use the usual common-support formulation with positive densities. A family has a monotone likelihood ratio in if for every , is a nondecreasing function . A monotone test here is an upper-cutoff test , , including constant tests. It does not mean an arbitrary smoothly increasing randomized rejection function.
Put . For a finite cutoff, choose between the values of below and above , with when the boundary has positive probability. On , and ; on , both are nonpositive. At a boundary with positive mass . Therefore
When there is probability on both sides, finite positive monotone ratios below the cutoff bound those above it away from zero, so can be positive and finite. A boundary with positive mass instead supplies the positive finite value . If the cutoff yields a constant test on the support, positivity on the common support proves strict propagation directly: a test identically zero cannot have greater power, and for a test identically one any positive-probability nonrejection by the competitor remains positive-probability at the larger parameter. Hence implies .
Let , taking when this set is empty. Below there is no positive difference. Above a finite there is a smaller parameter with positive difference, which propagates upward; the same reasoning applies when . Thus
No assertion at itself is needed.
For the final request fix any cutoff and prior density . Set and . The posterior odds are . If , then
Every bracket is nonnegative by monotone likelihood ratio. Equal statistics make the bracket zero, so the ratio depends only on . Dividing where the posterior is defined proves the posterior odds are nondecreasing in , with extended values allowed when one posterior mass is zero. This proves that posterior odds are monotone under a monotone likelihood ratio without restricting the prior's shape.
The common positive-support condition is material to the printed strict inequality. Under the broader definition permitting zero densities, take a two-parameter family on with and . Its likelihood ratio is nondecreasing. The cutoff test rejecting has greater power than the test rejecting only at parameter zero, but both have power one at parameter one. Thus the strict assertion needs the usual positivity convention; it is false without it.