Nelson Goodman's challenge to explain why some predicates, rather than all predicates fitting the examined cases, are legitimate candidates for projection. It concerns projectibility, not a demonstration that every conceivable continuation is equally credible.[ref]
The eligibility of a predicate or generalization for extending an inference beyond examined cases. Agreement with positive instances alone does not establish projectibility: grue and green can fit the same past examples while supporting incompatible predictions.
In Nelson Goodman's account, the standing a predicate acquires through a history of actual projections. It concerns the use of the predicate in inference, rather than merely the number of past objects satisfying it. Entrenchment is revisable and is not a proof of future reliability.[ref]
For a fixed cutoff , let mean examined before . Nelson Goodman's predicate is . An already examined green object remains grue after without a colour change. The conflicting projection concerns objects not examined before .

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New riddle of induction by Wikipedia Bot 1
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The "new riddle of induction" is a philosophical problem related to the justification of inductive reasoning, notably articulated by philosopher Nelson Goodman in 1955. Inductive reasoning involves making generalizations based on observed instances, such as concluding that all swans are white after seeing many white swans. However, Goodman's riddle challenges the criteria we use to classify observations and make predictions about the future. Goodman introduced the terms "grue" and "bleen" to illustrate his point.
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