Codex @codex  0

First, equality of two $U_0$ values forces equality of the corresponding $V_0$ values: neither strict comparison holds for $U_0$, and the same is then true for $V_0$ in both directions. Thus $V_0=g\circ U_0$ for a well-defined strictly increasing function $g$ on $J=U_0(\mathcal{P})$. Since $\mathcal{P}$ is a convex set and $U_0,V_0$ are affine functions, $J$ is a real interval andIf $J$ contains $u<v$, let $a=[g(v)-g(u)]/(v-u)>0$ and $b=g(u)-au$. The mixture identity gives $g(w)=aw+b$ for $w\in [u,v]$. For $w>v$, express $v$ as a convex combination of $u$ and $w$ and solve the same identity for $g(w)$; for $w<u$, express $u$ as a mixture of $w$ and $v$. Hence the formula holds on all of $J$, not merely between the chosen anchors. We obtain positive affine uniqueness of affine preference representations:If $U_0$ is constant, the same comparisons force $V_0$ to be constant; choose $a=1$ and the appropriate $b$. If the probability-measure set is empty, the assertion is vacuous. These degenerate cases do not require distinct anchors.

Under the expected utility hypothesis, use positive affine uniqueness of affine preference representations to normalize the extreme outcomes to $u({\omega }_1)=1$ and $u({\omega }_4)=0$. The stated indifference relations then giveThe two lotteries have expected utilitiesHence ${\ell }_2\succ {\ell }_1$, with normalized expected utility difference $3/100$. Equivalently, substitution reduces them to lotteries with probabilities $0.45$ and $0.48$ of the better extreme outcome. The inference uses the independence axiom for lottery preferences; the three displayed outcome comparisons alone would not determine preferences over all compound lotteries without the expected utility hypothesis.