Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium used in game theory, specifically in the context of extensive-form games, which can be represented by a tree-like structure. In an SPE, the strategy profile is not only a Nash Equilibrium in the game as a whole but also remains a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame of that game.
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A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile inducing a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, including subgames not reached during equilibrium play. A proper subgame starts at a node that forms a singleton information set, includes all its descendants, and does not cut any other information set; one cannot treat indistinguishable nodes as separate games.
The requirement excludes noncredible threats. Suppose an entrant chooses Out, giving both players , or Enter. After Enter, an incumbent chooses Fight with payoffs or Accommodate with payoffs , with entrant payoff first. Out together with a prescribed Fight is a Nash equilibrium: the threat deters entry and the incumbent's off-path action does not change its realized payoff. It is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, because after entry the incumbent prefers to . The subgame-perfect outcome is Enter followed by Accommodate.
In finite perfect-information games, backward induction in games constructs such profiles. More generally, continuation subgames may require solving simultaneous-move games in mixed strategies, as in an all-pay contest. Node-by-node optimization cannot ignore information sets in games of imperfect information.