Risk dominance is a concept from game theory that helps determine which of several potential strategies or equilibria in a game is more likely to be chosen by players when they are unsure of the actions of others. It is particularly useful in coordination games, where players have to make decisions without knowing what others will choose.

Quasi-perfect equilibrium is a concept from game theory, specifically related to dynamic games and extensive form games (games represented by trees with nodes and branches indicating possible moves by players). It is an extension of the idea of subgame perfect equilibrium, which requires that players' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the original game.

Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is a concept in game theory used to model decision-making under uncertainty, particularly in situations where players may not choose their strategies purely rationally. The idea is that players will respond probabilistically to their payoffs, reflecting some level of bounded rationality or cognitive limitations. In traditional Nash Equilibrium, players choose their strategies to maximize their payoffs given the strategies of others, assuming that they make fully rational decisions.

"Proper equilibrium" typically refers to a stable state in which various forces or factors are balanced in such a way that there is no tendency for change. This term can appear in various fields, including physics, economics, and environmental science, among others.

Pooling equilibrium is a concept from game theory and economics, particularly in the context of signaling games. It occurs when different types of players (or agents) in a market send the same signal, making it impossible for observers (or other players) to differentiate between them based on that signal. In a pooling equilibrium, all players choose the same action or strategy, so their different types (e.g.

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a refinement of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the context of dynamic games with incomplete information. It incorporates the concepts of beliefs and sequential rationality to provide a detailed analysis of players' strategies and their updates based on observed actions. The key elements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium include: 1. **Beliefs**: Players have beliefs about the types of other players (i.e., their private information) based on prior probabilities.

Nash equilibrium is a concept in game theory named after mathematician John Nash. It refers to a situation in a strategic game where no player can benefit by changing their strategy unilaterally, assuming that the other players' strategies remain constant. In other words, it is a state in which each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other players.

Mertens-stable equilibrium is a concept from game theory, particularly in the context of non-cooperative games. It refers to a way of identifying equilibria in games that is robust under the consideration of deviations by players. In a game, a strategy profile (a set of strategies chosen by players) can be considered an equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from their strategy, given the strategies of the others.

Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a refinement of the concept of Nash Equilibrium, applied to dynamic games with incomplete information. In such games, players make decisions at various points in time, and their strategies can depend not just on the current state of the game but also on the entire history of play. However, in the MPE, players base their decisions on the current state of the game rather than on its history.

The concept of "Manipulated Nash Equilibrium" is not a standard term in game theory literature but can pertain to scenarios where players in a game can strategize to influence or manipulate the outcome to their advantage while still adhering to the principles of Nash equilibrium. In a typical Nash equilibrium, each player’s strategy is optimal given the strategy chosen by all other players. In other words, no player can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy if the other players' strategies remain unchanged.

M equilibrium refers to a specific type of equilibrium in various contexts, but it most commonly relates to chemical equilibria or economic models. Here are two interpretations of M equilibrium: 1. **Chemical Equilibrium**: In the context of chemistry, M equilibrium could refer to a state in a chemical reaction where the concentrations of reactants and products remain constant over time. At this point, the rate of the forward reaction equals the rate of the reverse reaction.

The term "intuitive criterion" can refer to different contexts depending on the field of study or application, but generally, it describes a basis for making decisions or judgments that is guided by intuition rather than formal methods or analytical processes. Here are a few contexts in which you might encounter "intuitive criterion": 1. **Decision Making**: In decision theory or behavioral economics, an intuitive criterion may refer to a decision-making approach that relies on gut feelings, instincts, or heuristic methods.

The Folk theorem is a concept in game theory that describes conditions under which cooperation can emerge as a stable strategy in repeated games. Specifically, it states that in infinitely repeated games with a finite set of players, if the game's stage payoffs are sufficiently high, then any feasible payoff that is individually rational can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium through a strategy that involves punishment for deviations from cooperation.

An Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is a concept from evolutionary game theory that describes a strategy that, if adopted by a majority of a population, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare. The concept was first introduced by the biologist John Maynard Smith in the 1970s as a way to explain stable behavioral patterns in animal populations.

Equilibrium selection is a concept in game theory and economics that refers to the process of choosing among multiple equilibria in a strategic setting. In many games, especially those with multiple equilibria, different outcomes can exist, and it may not be clear which equilibrium will be reached in practice. Equilibrium selection seeks to identify which of these equilibria is more likely to be observed based on certain criteria or frameworks.

Epsilon-equilibrium, often denoted as ε-equilibrium, is a concept used in game theory, particularly in the context of non-cooperative games. It extends the idea of Nash equilibrium by allowing for a tolerance level, ε, that accounts for the possibility of small deviations from optimal play by players in the game. In a standard Nash equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to the strategies chosen by the other players.

"Divine equilibrium" is a term that can have various interpretations depending on the context in which it is used, including philosophical, spiritual, and scientific perspectives. 1. **Philosophical/Spiritual Context**: In many spiritual and philosophical traditions, divine equilibrium refers to a state of balance or harmony that is achieved when one is in alignment with a higher power or universal principles.

Correlated equilibrium is a concept in game theory that extends the idea of Nash equilibrium. It was introduced by Robert Aumann in the 1970s. The key idea behind correlated equilibrium is that players can achieve better outcomes by coordinating their strategies based on some form of common signal or correlation, rather than choosing their strategies independently. ### Definition: In a correlated equilibrium, a mediator (or correlation device) sends signals to the players, suggesting which strategies they should play.

A Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is a solution concept in game theory that extends the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium to account for the possibility of coalition formation among players. In a standard Nash equilibrium, a strategy profile is stable if no single player can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies of the other players. However, it does not consider the potential for groups of players to deviate together from the equilibrium, which can lead to different outcomes.

Berge equilibrium is a concept in game theory, particularly in the context of dynamic games with incomplete information. It is named after the French mathematician Claude Berge. The equilibrium represents a strategy profile where players choose their strategies optimally, given their beliefs about other players' types (or strategies), and where these strategies are consistently chosen based on the structure of the game.