Leader optimization in a sequential private-value all-pay contest

ID: leader-optimization-in-a-sequential-private-value-all-pay-contest

For a leader with nonnegative value and a continuous nonnegative follower-value cumulative distribution function , a bid gives expected payoff . Bidding zero guarantees nonnegative payoff, whereas a bid gives . Every best response therefore lies in , and the optimization is
A fixed upper bound is justified only under an additional normalization of the follower-value support; it is not a general restriction on effort.
If is a concave function, this objective function is concave. At a differentiable interior optimum it satisfies ; one-sided derivatives handle the endpoints. Flat intervals can give several best responses, as described in best-response selection at a flat leader objective. Every optimal bid also obeys the sharper inequality , by comparison with zero effort.

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