 Solution

In a two-player zero-sum game, the row player chooses a row, the column player chooses a column, and the row player's gain is the column player's loss. If their independent mixed strategies are probability vectors $x\in {\mathbb{R}}^m$, $y\in {\mathbb{R}}^n$, the row player's expected payoff is $x^{T}Py$.

The optimal mixed strategies solveThe minimax theorem equates these two guaranteed values. Equivalently, for a value $v$, $x_{\ast }^{T}P\ge v{1}^T$ and $P{y}_{\ast }\le v1$ componentwise.

For a row strategy $(p,1-p)$, the payoffs against the two pure columns are $2-6p$ and $-4+6p$. Their minimum is maximized at their intersection, $p=1/2$, where both are $-1$. Symmetrically the column player's maximum of the two row payoffs is minimized at $q=1/2$. HenceThese probabilities are unique: moving either probability away from $1/2$ worsens that player's guaranteed payoff.