The support of a finite mixed strategy consists of the pure strategies assigned positive probability. At a Nash equilibrium, every action in the support is a best response. In a game satisfying nondegeneracy of a bimatrix game, the two equilibrium supports have equal size.
Ancestors (5)
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- Equilibrium preservation under iterated weak dominance
- Lottery over joint action profiles
- Marginal-equivalent equilibria in additive contests
- Nash's theorem
- Nondegeneracy of a bimatrix game
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- Payoff matrix
- Positive-payoff linear programming for a matrix game
- Strategy support
- Subgame perfect equilibrium
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