 Solution

A tighter core is likely to have a more demanding cooling response, but the specification does not determine a unique peak cladding temperature or reflood time in a loss-of-coolant accident. Several effects compete.

At the same pre-accident power and comparable irradiation history, the total decay heat source remains of broadly comparable scale; increasing core power density does not multiply the total decay power by the inverse change in core volume. The core nevertheless has less water within its tighter rod lattice. Its local thermal buffer is smaller, and the same heat must be removed through narrower passages. If the normal-operation fuel temperature is higher, more stored fuel thermal energy must also be removed after shutdown.

Reduced passage size and increased hydraulic resistance can impede emergency-coolant penetration and steam discharge during reflood. Local two-phase flow, entrainment and boiling heat transfer can change, so single-phase pump-curve reasoning is insufficient during blowdown and reflood. Less local water can favor earlier uncovering, but blowdown flow and the much larger inventory elsewhere in the unchanged primary circuit also matter. It would be unjustified to infer a proportionate reduction in the entire primary-circuit inventory.

Loss of water also removes neutron moderation. In the assumed under-moderated reactor, this normally contributes negative reactor reactivity, helping suppress fission power. It does not eliminate decay heat after shutdown. The thermal challenge must therefore be assessed separately from the sign of this feedback.

A quantitative comparison needs break characteristics, initial states, emergency injection performance, bypass paths and a transient two-phase calculation. The defensible conclusion is potentially reduced thermal margin and more difficult reflood, requiring reassessment of the emergency core cooling system, rather than an unconditional prediction that every large-break transient becomes worse in every metric.