 Two-of-three all-pay participation equilibrium

Consider $n\ge 2$ identical players, prizes $w_j>0$, unit effort costs, and exactly two entries per player. The symmetric equilibrium omission probabilities $q_j$ sum to one. The common per-contest payoff is $u=({\sum }_j{w}_j^{-1/(n-1)}{)}^{-(n-1)}$, and the unconditional rival distribution on $0\le b\le w_j-u$ is $G_j(b)=((b+u)/w_j{)}^{1/(n-1)}$. Conditional on entry, its distribution function is $(G_j(b)-q_j)/(1-q_j)$. Choosing the omitted contest according to $q$ and sampling the two active efforts independently gives a symmetric equilibrium with expected payoff $2u$. These formulas determine the marginal laws; they do not determine the dependence between a player's two efforts.