Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2001 iii Paper 31 1 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
In a two-person Nash bargaining problem, an agreement specifies a jointly feasible pair of payoffs , measured in each player's own utility function. For a finite game, binding agreements can randomize jointly among action pairs, so the feasible payoff region is the convex hull of the pure-action payoff. This permits correlated joint actions; it is generally larger than the payoff region generated by independent mixed strategies. A disagreement point specifies what each player receives if negotiations fail. Assume a compact convex set of feasible agreements and at least one agreement strictly improving both disagreement payoffs.
A vector jointly dominates if , , and at least one inequality is strict. This is joint dominance of payoff vectors; strict improvement for both is unnecessary. A Pareto optimal agreement is one that has no feasible joint dominator. A jointly dominated agreement wastes a possible gain, but Pareto efficiency alone does not settle how gains should be divided. The negotiation set in two-person bargaining isIts individual-rationality constraints keep either player from accepting less than disagreement; its Pareto efficiency constraint rules out wasted opportunities. This negotiation set is distinct from objection-and-counterobjection bargaining sets for coalitional games.
The Nash arbitration procedure selects the Nash bargaining solution by maximizing gains relative to disagreement:The objective function is the Nash product. Essentiality makes its maximum positive; compactness gives attainment. On positive gains, its logarithm is , whose Hessian is diagonal and negative definite. Thus strict concavity on the feasible convex set makes the maximizing payoff vector unique. Positive gain in either coordinate increases the product, so the solution is Pareto optimal.
The procedure respects feasibility, bargaining individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, bargaining symmetry, positive affine invariance in bargaining, and bargaining independence of irrelevant alternatives. In particular, replacing each player's utility by a separate positive affine rescaling multiplies the product by a positive constant; it does not compare one player's raw utility scale to the other's. Deleting other feasible agreements cannot change a unique maximizer that remains feasible. Symmetry under interchange of the players gives equal selected coordinates when the bargaining problem itself is symmetric.
These properties also explain why the product rule is distinguished. Normalize a positive-gain maximizer to and disagreement to by positive affine maps. The first-order inequality along a segment from to any feasible gives . A sufficiently large symmetric triangle, bounded below in each coordinate and above by , contains the normalized feasible region. Symmetry and Pareto efficiency select in that triangle. Independence of irrelevant alternatives then selects the same point in the original normalized region, and affine invariance transforms it back. This is the supporting triangle for Nash bargaining argument; the assumptions of convexity and a strict joint improvement are important. Without strict improvement, a zero product need not select a unique agreement.
For a finite game, a natural disagreement convention is each player's security level payoff:where are the two payoff matrices and are mixed strategies. Each player can independently guarantee at least its own security level. The maximin bargaining solution applies the Nash product rule using this . In this convention, “maximin” determines the disagreement payoffs; it does not replace the arbitration objective function by , which would depend improperly on interpersonal utility scales. The resulting agreement can strictly benefit both players relative to their guarantees, yet need not benefit both relative to a particular noncooperative Nash equilibrium.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2003 iii Paper 37 4 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
A Nash bargaining problem consists of a compact convex set of feasible two-player payoff vectors and a disagreement point . If bargaining fails, the players receive ; agreement selects a feasible vector. The convex set allows jointly agreed correlated payoff lotteries over outcomes. Assume essentiality: some feasible vector strictly improves both coordinates of . The admissible answers satisfy bargaining individual rationality, .
The four characterizing axioms are Pareto efficiency (no feasible vector weakly improves both chosen payoffs and strictly improves one), bargaining symmetry (interchanging identical player roles leaves the answer unchanged), positive affine invariance in bargaining (independently replacing utilities by , , transforms the answer by the same maps), and bargaining independence of irrelevant alternatives (restricting to an admissible smaller feasible set that still contains the chosen vector leaves the choice unchanged). The last axiom keeps the disagreement point fixed.
The arbitration procedure maximizes the Nash product over individually rational vectors:A maximizer exists by compactness and has positive gains by essentiality. It is unique, since the logarithm of the product is a strictly concave function of the two gains on their positive domain. The product is strictly increasing in either positive gain, giving Pareto efficiency. A positive affine utility change multiplies the product by , giving positive affine invariance in bargaining. Uniqueness gives bargaining symmetry and bargaining independence of irrelevant alternatives.
For completeness, these axioms also force the procedure. Normalize the product-maximizing vector to and to zero using positive affine invariance in bargaining. For any normalized feasible vector , the directional derivative of the product along the feasible segment from to is . The initial part of that segment has positive gains, so optimality implies . Choose sufficiently large that the transformed feasible set is contained in the symmetric triangleOn this triangle, bargaining symmetry requires equal coordinates and Pareto efficiency then forces . By bargaining independence of irrelevant alternatives, restricting from to the original normalized set still selects . Undoing the normalization proves the Nash bargaining solution characterization. This is the supporting triangle for Nash bargaining argument.
For the numerical game, the maximin disagreement point is the vector of the players' separate security level payoffs. If player I uses its first action with probability , its worst expected payoff isThe two lines meet at ; before that point the increasing second line is smaller and afterwards the decreasing first line is smaller. Hence . If player II uses its first action with probability , its worst payoff ismaximized at , giving . Thus . These are separate worst-case guarantees; they need not equal the actual payoffs when both security strategies are used together.
The cooperative feasible set is the convex hull of the four outcome vectors. The outcomes and are dominated by . Its Pareto frontier is the segment joining to , with equation . Any maximizer of the positive Nash product is on this frontier. Bargaining individual rationality restricts its relevant portion to . There we maximizeThe stationary point lies strictly inside that interval and is the unique maximum. Therefore the Nash bargaining solution isThe gains are and , with Nash product . The arbitration can implement the vector by the agreed correlated payoff lottery assigning probability to outcome and to outcome . Indeed and . This is a correlated payoff lottery; independent mixed strategies are not required to implement the cooperative agreement.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2013 iii Paper 38 6 b Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
A security level payoff maximizes what a player guarantees against the opponent. Let be the row player's probability of the first action. Its guaranteed payoff isThe decreasing and increasing terms cross at , attaining ; moving either way lowers the smaller term. For the column player, any mixture has zero payoff against the first row, while its second-row payoff is nonnegative. Therefore andThe feasible set is the convex hull of the four joint pure-action payoff vectors. Its upper Pareto frontier connects to to . Write the row payoff as and column payoff as . On the first Pareto frontier segment, for . The Nash product isa concave quadratic with derivative , maximized at , , giving product . On the portion of the other Pareto frontier segment satisfying bargaining individual rationality, and . Its product derivative is positive throughout, so its largest product is at , smaller than . All dominated points can be discarded by Pareto efficiency. ConsequentlyThis payoff is implemented by a correlated payoff lottery choosing the payoff with probability and with probability . The convex hull permits such lotteries over joint outcomes; it is not restricted to independent mixed strategies.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2013 iii Paper 38 6 c Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Transposing the second player's matrix leaves the row player's security level payoff at . The column player's second action now yields payoffs and , while its first yields zero for either row. Its security level payoff is therefore , guaranteed by the second action; against the first row no mixture can guarantee more. Thus .
The relevant upper Pareto frontier joins the payoff vectors and , so . On the segment satisfying bargaining individual rationality , the Nash product becomesIts derivative is and its second derivative is . HenceThe implementing correlated payoff lottery chooses with probability and with probability . Both players' gains are strictly positive: and . The new disagreement point must be recomputed after transposition; reusing the previous column security payoff would solve a different Nash bargaining problem.
Feasible payoff polygons, security points and Nash bargaining solutions before and after transposing the column payoff matrix
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