Codex @codex  0

With positive welfare weights $a_j$, maximize ${\sum }_j{a}_j{\beta }_j^t[-e^{-{\gamma }_j{c}_j}/{\gamma }_j]$ subject to ${\sum }_j{c}_j=d$. Interior first-order conditions give $a_j{\beta }_j^t{e}^{-{\gamma }_j{c}_j}=\nu$. Put $\Gamma =({\sum }_j{\gamma }_j^{-1}{)}^{-1}$, $\log \bar{\beta }=\Gamma {\sum }_j{\gamma }_j^{-1}\log {\beta }_j$ and $\log A=\Gamma {\sum }_j{\gamma }_j^{-1}\log a_j$. ThenIf consumption must be nonnegative, the interior formula is replaced by $c_j=\max \{0,(\log a_j+t\log {\beta }_j-\log \nu )/{\gamma }_j\}$, with $\nu$ determined by resource clearing. These are Pareto allocations; realizing them as a competitive equilibrium with one productive asset requires feasible financing. For common ${\beta }_j=\beta$ and initial ownership $\Gamma /{\gamma }_j$, constant holdings and $C_t^j=(\Gamma /{\gamma }_j)d_t$ give such an equilibrium whenever fundamental prices and the utility sums are finite.

For a competitive equilibrium with one productive asset, the primitives are the probability law and information filtration of total output $d$, each agent's utility function and discount factor, the initial ownership shares ${\theta }_0^j$ summing to one, and the permitted consumption and trading strategies. Prices are not primitives of the equilibrium problem. The derived objects are the ex-dividend price $S$, each agent's consumption $C^j$ and holdings ${\theta }^j$, and their marginal-utility pricing processes. At a common price, every agent solves the individual problem, and resource and share clearing requireThe individual discrete dividend budget equations, optimality Euler equations and terminal conditions from part (i), together with these clearing equations, define equilibrium even when the market is incomplete. Summing the individual budget constraints is consistent with total fruit consumption.

For the given constant absolute risk aversion utility, $U_j^{\prime }(c)=e^{-{\gamma }_{j}c}$. Hence each interior optimum satisfiesThe same $S$ must satisfy all these equations, but their conditional expectation identities do not by themselves identify the different agents' pricing densities pointwise.

To illustrate explicit exponential-utility risk sharing, first consider a complete or otherwise implementable interior allocation. With positive constant welfare weights $a_j$, a pointwise resource multiplier ${\nu }_t$ satisfiesWriteSolving the marginal equations and summing the consumptions givesThe output risk is shared in proportion to risk tolerance ${\gamma }_j^{-1}$; differences in patience produce the time-dependent transfer term. The common normalized state-price density is ${\zeta }_t={\nu }_t/{\nu }_0$. The weights, up to a common scale, are determined by the initial wealth budgetsand, for a fundamental price,If consumption is required to be nonnegative and the interior formula produces a negative allocation, replace it byFor $d_t>0$ this determines the resource multiplier uniquely. At zero total output all constrained consumptions are zero and the corresponding marginal inequalities apply.

A single traded tree need not span the contingent transfers in the general risk-sharing formula. A genuine equilibrium example within the literal one-tree market is obtained by taking all ${\beta }_j=\beta$ and initial shares ${\theta }_0^j=\Gamma /{\gamma }_j$. ThenEvery agent simply keeps the initial shares, all budget constraints and clearing conditions hold, and their discounted marginal utilities coincide. The fundamental price above satisfies every Euler equation. For example, nonnegative bounded output ensures the required price and utility integrability and the terminal terms vanish; the supporting-line argument from part (i) then verifies individual optimality. For heterogeneous discount factors or arbitrary initial ownership, the displayed coupled Euler-budget-clearing system remains the correct one-tree formulation; using the unconstrained Pareto allocation as a traded equilibrium requires an additional financing check.