Bell-LaPadula model 2026-10-31
A classification-based information confidentiality model restricting subject accesses to prevent forbidden information flow. The simple security property restricts reading above clearance; the Bell-LaPadula star property restricts information flow through current reads and writes. It is not a complete data integrity policy.
Chain of custody 2026-11-05
In digital forensics, a chain of custody is the documented history of who possessed or handled an item of digital evidence, when transfers occurred and what actions were taken. It connects an analyzed item with its recorded collection and subsequent handling. The record concerns provenance and accountability, while data integrity concerns whether the relevant data changed.[ref]
For an original example, an evidence drive is recorded as collected by A at09:00, transferred to B at10:00 and delivered to C at12:00. If B's receipt and transfer record are missing, matching serial numbers at the endpoints do not explain what happened during the intervening interval. That is a gap in documentation, not by itself proof of alteration.
A cryptographic hash function supplies complementary evidence about a particular byte sequence. A matching digest can support continuity of the data under the hash function's security assumptions, but does not identify everyone who had access to it. A complete custody log likewise cannot establish the truth of every statement stored on a device.
A useful record therefore distinguishes the physical item, any acquired copies and the actions applied to each. Conclusions should state what that record supports; documentation alone does not determine every question about an incident.
Database management system 2026-11-05
A database management system is software that defines, stores, queries and updates databases while managing access, integrity and concurrent use. Its components can include a query parser, optimizer, storage manager, transaction manager and recovery mechanism. A database is the managed collection; the database management system supplies the mechanisms and interfaces used to operate on it.
For example, evaluating
SELECT name FROM Person WHERE id = 7 requires interpreting the query, choosing an access path, retrieving visible records and returning the selected field. An index can speed the lookup without changing its logical result. Concurrent updates may require locks or versions, and a crash may require log replay. Merely writing records to a file does not supply those guarantees. PostgreSQL's tutorial illustrates the distinction between client applications, the server process managing database files and connections, and the databases accessed through that server.[ref]Concepts in the PostgreSQL documentation. §2.2, client/server architecture and database organization
Karen Kent 2026-11-05
Karen Kent is the first-listed author of the 2006 Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response by Karen Kent and others. The guide connects digital forensics to investigating computer security incidents and operational faults, separating collection, examination, analysis and reporting.[ref]
Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response by Karen Kent and others. Title page; §2.1, printedp.2-2; §3
A technical distinction in that workflow is preserving data integrity while separately evaluating what collected data establishes. The guide describes comparing message digests of original and copied data.[ref]
Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response by Karen Kent and others. §3.1.2, printedp.3-4, data-integrity verification
For an original counterexample, suppose two computer files contain the same two bytes, with hexadecimal values and , but their recorded paths and creation times differ. A deterministic cryptographic hash function applied only to those content bytes returns the same value for both. That comparison does not establish equality of their file metadata, identify who created either file, or prove when an event occurred. The input being hashed determines what the comparison can support.
First, the Bell-LaPadula model is a information confidentiality policy. It permits a low-level subject to overwrite a more highly classified object by blind writing. That can destroy a high-level file or introduce false data without disclosing its old contents. Thus it does not supply a data integrity policy, and it also does not ensure service availability. Modern multiuser operating systems require protection against modification and resource exhaustion as well as disclosure.
Second, a single hierarchy of classifications cannot express ordinary independent user ownership and selective collaboration. Two users at the same level may still need different permissions on their respective files; conversely, an authorised publication may deliberately release selected information to lower levels. The simple model lacks those owner-specific permissions and controlled release decisions. Adding discretionary access control, categories and explicit declassification mechanisms is substantial additional policy.