Andrew Yao Created 2026-10-31 Updated 2026-11-05
With Danny Dolev, he developed formal models for the security of cryptographic protocols using public-key cryptography. Their Dolev-Yao model makes an active adversary's possible manipulations explicit while treating the underlying encryption and decryption symbolically. The resulting distinction is useful: a protocol can fail through its pattern of messages even if its encryption primitives behave as intended.[ref]
Danny Dolev Created 2026-10-31 Updated 2026-11-05
Danny Dolev is a computer scientist whose work with Andrew Yao helped establish formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. Their 1981 report studied active adversaries that can alter or replay messages and impersonate participants, going beyond passive observation of encrypted traffic.[ref]
The Dolev-Yao model isolates protocol structure by treating encryption and decryption as symbolic operations with specified cancellation rules. Security analysis then asks what messages the adversary can construct from available knowledge. This supplies a tractable mathematical question about a defined model; connecting the model to an implementation requires its assumptions to hold.
Solutions to all three questions of the examination dated 15 June 2015. The cover permits candidates to answer two questions.[ref]
The authentication claims in Question 2 require particular care: the printed third message permits substitution of Bob's key ticket after his cryptographic nonce becomes public. The solutions distinguish the intended freshness argument from the Dolev-Yao model attack that defeats Bob's authentication. This is a property of the printed protocol, rather than a missing part of the source.
In the Dolev-Yao model, an adversary controls the network: it can intercept, suppress, delay, replay and redirect messages, impersonate network senders, and construct messages from values it knows. In particular, it can concatenate or split unprotected tuples, and can apply encryption using any known public key or known symmetric key.
Cryptography is idealised. Without the required private key or symmetric key, the adversary cannot recover a protected plaintext or construct an otherwise unavailable protected value. It cannot invent an unknown long-term secret merely because the containing ciphertext is visible. Protocol failures arise from the arrangement of messages even when these cryptographic primitives behave perfectly.