Starting from a recursively axiomatized arithmetic first-order theory with the usual arithmetical provability predicates, define
If every stage is first-order consistent, the Gödel second incompleteness theorem makes every step strict in the consistency-strength preorder: the next stage proves the preceding stage's formal consistency statement, which that preceding stage cannot prove. Every formal proof from the effective union uses only finitely many axioms and lies in one stage. Thus the union is first-order consistent under this hypothesis and lies strictly above every finite stage. Arithmetic soundness of is a sufficient starting assumption, since each added formal consistency statement is then true in the standard natural numbers.
Consistency of alone does not ensure consistency of the next stage. Assuming Peano arithmetic is first-order consistent, is first-order consistent by the Gödel second incompleteness theorem. Proof inclusion makes it prove , so adding produces an inconsistent next stage. The hypotheses for a progression must therefore distinguish a consistent starting theory from consistency of all its iterates.
Consider extending by a rule sending every to . Put . The initial consistency axiom proves by the negated-consistency extension theorem, so the rule proves . But is provable by inclusion of proofs, making inconsistent. Arithmetic verifies its finite contradiction proof. Thus the unrestricted rule proves both that theory's consistency and inconsistency. This differs from an externally justified progression along specified sound theories.

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