Andrew Yao Created 2026-10-31 Updated 2026-11-05
With Danny Dolev, he developed formal models for the security of cryptographic protocols using public-key cryptography. Their Dolev-Yao model makes an active adversary's possible manipulations explicit while treating the underlying encryption and decryption symbolically. The resulting distinction is useful: a protocol can fail through its pattern of messages even if its encryption primitives behave as intended.[ref]
Danny Dolev Created 2026-10-31 Updated 2026-11-05
Danny Dolev is a computer scientist whose work with Andrew Yao helped establish formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. Their 1981 report studied active adversaries that can alter or replay messages and impersonate participants, going beyond passive observation of encrypted traffic.[ref]
The Dolev-Yao model isolates protocol structure by treating encryption and decryption as symbolic operations with specified cancellation rules. Security analysis then asks what messages the adversary can construct from available knowledge. This supplies a tractable mathematical question about a defined model; connecting the model to an implementation requires its assumptions to hold.