For three players, the predecessor-set weights are for sizes zero and two, and for size one. Thus
Therefore the Shapley value is , whose coordinates sum to .
For the nucleolus, use imputations , , , . The excess of is . Thus the smallest possible largest excess is at least . It is attained when , , and : the remaining proper-coalition excesses then are
all at most , while . Conversely, a largest excess of forces and precisely this interval for .
On this first-stage face the top excess is fixed. The next largest excess is , because the other varying excesses are nonpositive and is fixed. Its unique minimum is zero at . No further lexicographic tie remains. Hence the nucleolus is . Its proper-coalition excesses, sorted decreasingly, are .
Finally, a core allocation would require and , whose sum contradicts the efficient total . Thus the core of a cooperative game is empty. The game is not superadditive, so neither core nonemptiness nor individual rationality of the Shapley value should be presumed. Under the distinct prenucleolus convention the answer would be . Balancing and gives a first-stage maximum of and forces . The remaining first-stage constraints restrict to . The next largest complaints are and , balanced at , with . This is not an imputation and is not the nucleolus under the definition in (a).

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