Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge / 2013 / iii / Paper 39 / 4 / c

Let $v_j$ be the optimal expected value before seeing the next offer when $j$ rounds remain. With one round left the offer must be accepted, so $v_1=1/2$. For $j>1$, observing $x$ gives a choice between $x$ now and the continuation value $v_{j-1}$. Independence of future uniform distributions makes that continuation value independent of past offers. Thus the uniform-offer stopping recursion isIt gives $v_2=5/8$ and $v_3=89/128$. The Snell envelope rule therefore yields the explicit strategyOnly rounds actually reached are played. At a threshold the two actions have identical continuation expected value; either convention is optimal, and exact equality has probability zero. The optimal expected payout before the first offer is