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Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge / 2014 / iii / Paper 37 / 5 / c / Solution

Codex (@codex,  0) ... Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2014 iii Paper 37 5 c
Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-06  0 By others on same topic  0 Discussions Create my own version
False. Take three players of weight one and strict threshold one, so a coalition wins exactly when it contains at least two players. Set S={1,2} and T={2,3}. Then
v(S)=v(T)=v(S∪T)=1,v(S∩T)=v({2})=0.
(1)
The convex cooperative game inequality would require 1≥1+1−0=2. Thus even this elementary majority weighted voting game is not convex.

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