A Kripke model for intuitionistic propositional logic for a propositional language is a poset together with a persistent forcing relation on atoms: if and , then . Extend forcing byandNo world forces . Induction proves persistence for every proposition.
The Kripke completeness theorem for intuitionistic propositional logic saysfor every world in every intuitionistic Kripke model.
Take a root with two incomparable successors . Force but not at , force but not at , and force neither at . Then because of , and because of . Henceso completeness shows that this proposition is not intuitionistically valid.
On equivalence classes defineand, for every atomic proposition , put exactly when . This is well-defined, is a partial order, and makes atomic forcing persistent.
The filtration of a Kripke model truth lemma statesConjunction and disjunction are immediate by induction. For implication, if and , then belongs to ; if , induction gives , hence and . Conversely, if , some actual forces but not ; persistence gives , which witnesses failure in the quotient. Thus every formula in is preserved.
Let consist of all finite nondecreasing pathsordered by initial-segment extension. The one-point path is least, and the predecessors of any path are its initial segments, hence linearly ordered. Force an atom at a path exactly when it is forced at the path's endpoint.
The endpoint map is monotone and has the back property: if , append to . Induction on propositions therefore givesIn particular the roots force exactly the same propositions. This is the unravelling of a Kripke model.
Assume . By Kripke completeness there is a rooted countermodel. Unravel it into a tree and retain only the subformulas of . Whenever a retained node fails an implication , retain one successor witnessing and the failure of . Along a branch, passing to a genuinely new witness strictly enlarges the finite theory of subformulas, so at most witness levels are needed. Identifying repeated equal theories and retaining at most one witness for each failed implication leaves at most representatives for each of the at most theories. The resulting pruned filtration has at most worlds and still refutes by the truth lemma.
Thus every underivable formula with subformulas has a countermodel of size at most . The contrapositive proves the claim and is the quantitative Finite model property of intuitionistic propositional logic.
A Sigma-1 formula is a formula equivalent in first-order arithmetic towhere is bounded. A Pi-1 formula is similarly equivalent to with bounded .
The Diagonal lemma states that for every formula with one free variable there is a sentence such thatThe same conclusion holds in every theory extending the arithmetic needed to formalize substitution.
The crude incompleteness theorem says that every consistent recursively axiomatized extension of is incomplete.
Suppose instead that were complete. Enumerating proofs until either or appears would decide theoremhood, so its characteristic function would be total recursive. By the assumed representation theorem, choose a formula such that proves when and proves when . The diagonal lemma supplies withIf , then , so and is inconsistent. If , then the characteristic value is zero, so and hence , again a contradiction. Completeness must therefore fail.
The recursive theory is consistent because . By the Gödel-Rosser theorem it has an undecidable sentence , so both and are consistent. Exactly one of is false in ; add that one to . The first-order completeness theorem gives a model, and the Downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem gives a countable model . Then , but disagrees with on the chosen sentence and is therefore not elementarily equivalent to it.
Consistency of makes and disjoint. Suppose a recursive set separated them, and let represent its total characteristic function in . By the Diagonal lemma, choose a sentence satisfyingPut . If , representability gives and hence , so , contradicting . If , representability gives and hence , so , again a contradiction. Therefore and are recursively inseparable.
A partial function is lambda-definable if there is a lambda term such thatwhenever the value is defined, while outside the domain the application reduces to no Church numeral.
The Strong normalization theorem for simply typed lambda calculus says that every well-typed term has no infinite beta-reduction sequence. In the untyped calculus,reduces to itself and is therefore not strongly normalizing.
The nowhere-defined partial function is represented byFor every Church numeral , the term reduces to and hence to no numeral. If had type , the strong normalization theorem would make every reduction sequence from finite, contradicting the visible infinite reduction inside . Thus this partial function is lambda-definable by an untypable term of the required kind.
A closed beta-eta-long normal term of type must have the form , where the normal term can only be or : the pure calculus has no constants or other closed source of a value of the atomic type . Hence the only two beta-eta-equivalence classes are the Church Booleans
TakeIt has type . If , the body selects . If , it reduces to , which selects exactly when . Thus it has the stated truth table.
For define a typed transition term by a nested Boolean choice:Here a Church Boolean acts as an if-then-else operator. The assumed behavior of gives .
Given a finite input word , construct the typed term effectively and beta-normalize it. The Strong normalization theorem for simply typed lambda calculus guarantees termination, and confluence gives exactly one of the finitely many normal forms . Compare that normal form syntactically with the listed accepting states in . This algorithm accepts exactly when , so is recursive. Equivalently, this is the standard theorem that every language recognized by a deterministic finite automaton is a regular language and hence decidable.
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