The literal semantic hypothesis is insufficient: a semantic Gödel fixed point need not be canonical. A sentence can be false and provable in a consistent, unsound arithmetic theory, in which case both sides of the stipulated semantic biconditional can be false.
For a concrete counterexample, assume PA is consistent and set . Gödel's second incompleteness theorem makes this extension consistent: otherwise PA would prove its own consistency. It is still bounded-complete. Use ordinary numeralwise proof and refutation enumerators for this recursively axiomatized theory, and take . This is false in the standard natural numbers but is an axiom of . Since it is provable, is true; its negation is false. Thus the semantic fixed-point biconditional required in this part is true, with both sides false.
Choose by the usual canonical Rosser construction for these proof matrices. Its undecidability follows from the preceding parts, and it is a true sentence: if it were false, its true negation would be provable in this bounded-complete theory, contradicting undecidability. Hence is false and true, so their proposed semantic equivalence is false. This counterexample meets the literal assumptions and does not exploit a missing source page.
Under the intended canonical Gödel/Rosser convention, the expected answer does hold. Consistency plus bounded completeness implies soundness: a false theorem has a standard bounded counterexample whose negation the theory proves. If canonical were false, its truth fixed point would make it provable, contradicting this soundness; thus is true. Canonical is true by the preceding -negation argument, so both canonical sentences are true and their equivalence is true. This last conclusion needs that canonical construction or an equivalent additional restriction; truth of a biconditional alone does not supply it.

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