Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford / 2017 / 7

Empirical equivalence must be stronger than agreement with the evidence already collected: relative to a stated domain, empirically equivalent theories yield the same possible observational consequences. If they nevertheless make incompatible claims about unobservable entities, observations in that domain cannot alone determine which ontology is correct. This is a strong form of scientific underdetermination, directed against a unique inference from empirical success to full theoretical truth.

The scientific realist has several responses. One may deny that every formally constructed alternative is a serious physical rival, appeal to independently justified explanatory virtues, or restrict commitment to the structure genuinely shared by the alternatives. If two descriptions are connected by a change of variables or a gauge transformation, apparent difference may be representational rather than a disagreement about the world. Before calling such a pair a counterexample, identify what incompatible physical claims remain.

Actual and merely possible rivals have different evidential force. An actual, comparably developed rival demonstrates that the current inference is nonunique under specified criteria. A merely possible rival refutes a claim of logical entailment if its possibility is established, but does not automatically defeat ordinary fallible justification: otherwise any unexcluded sceptical possibility would defeat almost every empirical belief. A distant conceivable alternative need not deserve the same prior probability or explanatory standing as a well-tested account.

Consequently, empirical equivalence is a serious challenge to unrestricted, uniquely determined theoretical belief. It is not a deductive disproof of all scientific realism. A convincing argument must say whether the target is certainty or defeasible warrant, whether equivalence covers all observations or only present data, and why the rivals are physically distinct. Merely announcing that another story could be invented leaves these crucial questions unanswered.

Instrumentalism treats theoretical descriptions primarily as tools for organizing and predicting observations rather than as a literally true inventory of unobservable entities. Its attraction is epistemic economy: where empirical success is all the evidence establishes, using a successful calculation need not commit us to every mechanism appearing in it. The abandonment of phlogiston illustrates why such caution can be reasonable.

However, distinguish three claims: we can use a theory without believing it; we ought to suspend belief about some of its entities; and those entities do not exist or theoretical sentences are not truth-apt. The first is commonplace and does not establish the last two. Constructive empiricism interprets theoretical claims literally while distinguishing acceptance for empirical adequacy from belief in the whole theory. It therefore offers restraint without treating all theoretical language as a disguised calculation recipe.^[ref]

A scientific realist can answer that independent experimental access, successful interventions and unexpectedly accurate new predictions support some entities more strongly than mere curve fitting. The no-miracles argument treats this convergence as something needing explanation. The reply is not conclusive: explanatory success need not guarantee truth, and selectively retained successful theories can make retrospective success look stronger than it was. Equally, historical failures do not show that every present theoretical commitment is equally fragile.

There is therefore a good argument for instrumental use and selective suspension of belief where evidence does not discriminate ontologies. There is a weaker argument for universal instrumentalism about every scientific entity. A defensible position should compare the actual evidence for particular commitments and explain why empirical adequacy is the right stopping point, rather than infer global agnosticism from the bare possibility of error.