Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford / 2019 / 7 / b / Solution

A commitment to testing claims against experience is a defensible scientific norm. A strict account according to which every meaningful scientific statement must be conclusively verified, or translated into a fixed vocabulary of theory-free observations, is much harder to sustain. Logical empiricism should also be understood as a changing family of projects, not reduced without qualification to its strongest early formulations.

An unrestricted universal scientific law concerns cases beyond a finite observation record. No finite list of favourable cases deductively entails all of them. Requiring conclusive verification would therefore exclude much ordinary theoretical science. Replacing that demand with scientific confirmation retains a relation to evidence while accepting that support is fallible. This is a substantive revision, rather than proof that universal laws were conclusively verified after all.^[ref]

A second difficulty concerns observations. A detector count relies on assumptions about sensitivity, background and the production of a signal. Theory-ladenness makes a sharp division between completely neutral observations and theoretical claims implausible. But dependence on some assumptions does not imply dependence on the truth of the target theory. A calibration can be supported independently, and agreement across instruments using different mechanisms can make a putative effect less vulnerable to one shared error.

Nor should unobservable vocabulary be dismissed merely because its referents cannot be seen directly. A theory of electrons and electromagnetic fields can organize measured currents, spectra and scattering through a common model. What matters scientifically is how the theoretical commitments constrain observations and survive attempts to discriminate them from alternatives. Insisting that each term independently translate into an observation report can miss the role of a whole theoretical structure.

An empiricist can accept much of this. Constructive empiricism permits literal theoretical discourse and commitment to using a theory while restricting belief to empirical adequacy. It separates withholding a stronger ontological belief from refusing to reason with theoretical models.^[ref] Whether this restraint is preferable to selective scientific realism remains an argument about what successful testing warrants.

The strongest sustainable empiricism is consequently methodological and fallible: demand explicit empirical consequences, scrutinize calibration and preserve the possibility of correction. The stricter verificationist reduction does not adequately describe how laws, theoretical terms and measurement actually work. Rejecting that reduction need not weaken the central demand that scientific claims remain accountable to evidence.