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For distinct players $i,j$, expand each probabilistic Banzhaf index by whether the sampled coalition contains the other player. The terms $v(T)$ and $v(T\cup \{i,j\})$ cancel on subtraction, leaving the displayed identity. In a weighted voting game with $w_i\le w_j$, every summand is nonnegative, proving that the index is monotone in the player's weight. Equal weights give equal indices, although different weights can also have equal indices.

The normalized Banzhaf index rescales the probabilistic Banzhaf indices to sum to the grand-coalition value, whenever the denominator is nonzero. It preserves cooperative-game symmetry and assigns zero to a null player, but generally fails cooperative-game additivity. For example, add the three-player majority game to a dictatorship of player one. Their normalized indices are $(1/3,1/3,1/3)$ and $(1,0,0)$, whereas the sum game has normalized index $(6/5,2/5,2/5)$, not their vector sum. The sum game has grand-coalition value two, which must be retained in the normalization.

Use the inclusive quota: a coalition wins at weight at least $25$. For each player, count losing predecessor coalitions that become winning when that player joins. Group these swing counts by predecessor cardinality $t=0,1,2,3$:

For example, player one is pivotal for predecessor coalitions $\{2\}$, $\{2,3\}$, $\{2,4\}$, $\{3,4\}$ and $\{2,3,4\}$. Player three is pivotal only for $\{1,4\}$; player four has the symmetric counterpart.

Each swing contributes $1/8$ to the probabilistic Banzhaf index. For the Shapley value, a swing with $t$ predecessors contributes $t!(3-t)!/4!$, which is $1/4,1/12,1/12,1/4$ for the four possible sizes. Applying these weights to the table givesThe Shapley values sum to one. The unnormalized Banzhaf indices sum to $5/4$; they must not be replaced by normalized shares in this part.

The probabilistic Banzhaf index satisfies cooperative-game symmetry, the null player axiom and cooperative-game additivity, but not cooperative-game efficiency.

For cooperative-game symmetry, interchangeable players have $v(Ti)=v(Tj)$ for every $T$ omitting them. The Banzhaf difference identity therefore gives equal indices. For a null player, every marginal contribution in the defining average is zero, so its index is zero.

For cooperative-game additivity, each marginal contribution is additive:Averaging both sides over the same $2^{n-1}$ coalitions gives ${\beta }_i(v+w)={\beta }_i(v)+{\beta }_i(w)$.

For failure of cooperative-game efficiency, the indices computed in part (b) sum to $5/4$, whereas the grand-coalition value is one. This is already a counterexample. Independently, a three-player majority game gives each player index $1/2$, also exceeding the total value when summed. Pivotality averaged over independently chosen coalitions does not telescope in the way the ordering-average Shapley value does.

Where its denominator is nonzero, normalization enforces cooperative-game efficiency and preserves cooperative-game symmetry and the null player axiom. The violated axiom is cooperative-game additivity.

For an exact counterexample on three players, let $v$ be the majority game, and let $w$ be the dictatorship in which a coalition wins precisely when it contains player one. Their probabilistic Banzhaf indices arewith $v(N)=w(N)=1$. HenceUnnormalized indices add, so $\beta (v+w)=(3/2,1/2,1/2)$. Their sum is $5/2$, while $(v+w)(N)=2$. ThereforeThe sum game is a valid transferable utility game, although it is not binary; that is the natural domain of the additivity axiom. The failure comes from a game-dependent scaling factor. A zero denominator, as for the zero game, makes the displayed normalization undefined unless a separate convention is supplied; none of the counterexample's denominators vanish.

The probabilistic Banzhaf index averages a player's marginal contribution over all coalitions not containing that player, each given equal weight. In a simple cooperative game, it is the probability of changing a losing coalition into a winning one when every other player joins independently with probability $1/2$. Its sum over players need not equal the grand-coalition value: in a three-player majority game each player has index $1/2$, giving total $3/2$ despite $v(N)=1$. This convention differs from both the raw count of pivotal coalitions and the normalized Banzhaf index.

The name refers to John Banzhaf, whose 1965 paper addresses the mathematical analysis of weighted voting.^[ref]