A player's marginal contribution to a coalition is the increase in its value when that player joins. In a convex cooperative game, marginal contributions increase with the preceding coalition. Averaging contributions across player orderings gives the Shapley value.
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- Transferable utility game
- Cooperative game theory
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- Coalition (game theory)
- Convex cooperative game
- Cooperative game theory
- Dual coalitional game
- Linearity of the Shapley value
- Marginal contribution
- Marginal contribution vector
- Null player
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