All-pay auction Created 2026-10-06 Updated 2026-10-14
In a standard all-pay auction, every player pays its bid or effort cost, and the highest bid receives the prize. With a value , unit effort cost, and winning probability , player has quasilinear utility . Equal highest bids require an explicit tie rule.
Expected utility Created 2026-10-14 Updated 2026-11-05
Expected utility is the expected value of a utility function applied to a random outcome, using the decision-maker's probabilities. For a finite lottery, it is . It is the expectation of utility, which generally differs from utility of the expected outcome.
For a risk-neutral bidder with fixed valuation , winning indicator and possibly random payment , quasilinear utility gives and henceIf losing bidders pay nothing, this can be written when the winning probability is positive. It cannot be used without that payment assumption: in an all-pay auction, a deterministic bid is paid even after losing, so the expectation is .
In a first-price sealed-bid auction with at least two bidders, continuous nonnegative bids, quasilinear utility and positive private value , no bid is a dominant strategy. Against opponents all bidding zero, any positive bid can be lowered while still winning, increasing the payoff. Bid zero fails against an opposing bid , since bidding earns . Nor does randomizing create a dominant strategy. Against all-zero opponents, a random bid has expected payoff strictly below unless it is identically zero and receives the item with certainty under the tie rule. In the strict case, a sufficiently small positive fixed bid earns more. In the exceptional case, the deviation against again improves the payoff. Finite expected utility is implicit; an expected payoff of negative infinity cannot dominate finite-payoff bids. The positive-value condition matters: a zero-value bidder weakly prefers bid zero.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2003 iii Paper 37 5 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Let denote player 's expected payoff, so the definition also covers mixed strategies. If is a dominant strategy, thenfor every opponents' profile and every alternative . In particular this holds at . Thus no player can improve its payoff by a unilateral deviation from , which is exactly the definition of a Nash equilibrium. A profile of dominant strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
For the second-price sealed-bid auction, use the usual private-value auction assumptions: a bidder with value has quasilinear utility minus its payment if it wins, and zero if it loses. Fix the highest opposing bid . If , winning gives , and bidding wins. If , winning gives , and bidding loses. If , winning or losing gives zero, irrespective of the tie rule. Any other bid can only change whether the bidder wins, not the payment conditional on winning. It therefore cannot improve on the truthful bid in any of these cases. Hence bidding the true value is a weakly dominant strategy. Neither symmetry nor independence of the opposing values is needed for this argument.
For part (a), in a first-price sealed-bid auction with , continuous nonnegative bids and , no fixed bid is a dominant strategy. A positive bid can be improved against opponents all bidding zero: replace it by , still win, and increase the payoff by . Bid zero can be improved against an opposing highest bid : bidding wins and earns , whereas zero loses. This proves the no dominant positive-value bid in a first-price auction result.
Allowing mixed strategies does not change that conclusion. Against all-zero opponents, a random bid has expected payoff strictly below unless it is always zero and the tie rule awards this bidder the item with certainty. Any positive bid incurs a strictly positive payment, and any probability of losing at zero also reduces the payoff below . In the strict case choose a sufficiently small positive fixed bid so that exceeds the random bid's expected payoff. In the exceptional case the preceding deviation against still improves it. The assumptions matter: for value zero, bid zero is weakly dominant; with only one bidder it is also optimal. Consequently there is no dominant strategy for a positive-value bidder in the standard first-price setting.
Part (b)'s printed nonexistence request is false under the stated symmetric independent private values model. Lack of a dominant strategy does not imply lack of a Nash equilibrium. For incomplete private information the appropriate equilibrium is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium of the game whose strategies are bidding rules as functions of private values. Here is an explicit counterexample with a full deviation check.
Let the risk-neutral bidders have independent valuations with the uniform distribution on , and put . Suppose every opponent bids . A bidder with value who bids wins with probability , since the opposing values must all be below . Ties have probability zero, including at either endpoint. Its expected quasilinear utility isFor ,Thus increases up to and decreases thereafter. For , bid zero is optimal directly. A bid above wins with certainty and pays more than bidding , so it cannot improve on the maximum already found in . A randomized bid is a mixture of these payoffs and also cannot improve on their maximum. The best response for every value is therefore the proposed bidding rule itself. This proves the uniform private-value first-price bidding equilibrium:The value- expected equilibrium payoff is . The bidding rule is a pure strategy in the Bayesian game, even though values are random. Therefore the requested general nonexistence claim in (b) has a counterexample, rather than a valid proof. The defect is present in the original PDF, not introduced by the converted text.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 4 b Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Write the first endowment as . The budget constraint at normalized prices is . Because the quasilinear utility is increasing in , the budget binds, and its maximization reduces to maximizing over . Its derivative is and its second derivative is , giving the unique demand correspondenceThe first-good demand has no wealth effect. Since the second consumer's endowment and preference relation are fixed, everywhere. Thus the joint condition of part (a) becomes at equilibrium; it is not automatically satisfied.
Here is a complete smooth counterexample, with the second consumer's consumption set specified explicitly. The question does not impose the first consumer's consumption set on the second consumer. Take endowments and . Give the second consumer consumption set , where , and put . Its utility function isThis defines complete, transitive, continuous preference relations. It is in fact smooth on : writing and , the positive branch is ; at all derivatives tend to zero locally uniformly where . The endowment belongs to . Allowing negative holdings is explicit here, just as the first consumer's second coordinate is unrestricted in the printed question.
We now derive, rather than posit, the second consumer's demand correspondence. For , the upper contour is described by , with . At a fixed , its cheapest first coordinate uses . Minimizing total expenditure over therefore means minimizingThe unique minimum occurs at , with . The expenditure necessary to reach this contour is consequentlySet and . Wealth is , so the best affordable contour hasAll affordable positive-utility bundles have , and the minimum-expenditure bundle on that contour is unique and spends precisely the budget. Zero-utility bundles cannot be optimal because this positive-utility bundle is available. Substitution yields globally smooth unique demands for every :The aggregate excess demand is nowFor every , the unique equilibrium price is , and . At this price the allocations are and , whose sum equals the aggregate endowment . Second-good excess demand is , so it too is smooth and clears. Hence every economy in this smooth parameterized family is singular. This demonstrates why the first consumer's missing wealth effect alone gives no transversality guarantee; the stronger conclusion in part (c) comes from the second consumer's additional demand restriction.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 4 c Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
When both consumers have the same quasilinear utility on , the same strictly concave one-variable maximization gives , independently of their wealth. If their first-good endowments are , thenThus the joint regular-value condition always holds. With positive total first-good endowment, the equilibrium isBoth first-good markets and second-good markets clear: second-good demands sum to . If a nonstandard endowment choice has , there is no positive-price zero, so the regular value condition is vacuous. In the usual positive-endowment case every parameter has the displayed unique regular exchange economy.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2005 iii Paper 40 6 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
In a second-price sealed-bid auction, fix the other players' bids and let be their highest bid. A player of valuation who wins pays , obtaining quasilinear utility ; losing gives zero. If , winning is optimal and bidding wins. If , losing is optimal and bidding loses. If , winning and losing both give zero, regardless of the fixed tie-breaking rule. Thus truthful bidding is a dominant strategy. In particular the profile in which every bidder bids its valuation is a Nash equilibrium, for every valuation profile, not merely on average.
A symmetric independent private values model gives each bidder a private valuation determined by its own type. The types are independent draws from a common distribution, and the bidders have identical roles and preferences. In the standard bidding calculation bidders are risk-neutral with quasilinear utility: they maximize expected valuation minus payment. Strategies map each bidder's privately observed value to a bid. Equilibrium in this incomplete-information setting means a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Take with independent uniform values on . In a first-price sealed-bid auction, if all players bid their valuations, a type earns zero whenever it wins and zero whenever it loses. But for , bidding instead yields positive expected utilityTherefore truthful first-price bidding is not an equilibrium.
For the candidate uniform private-value first-price bidding equilibrium, put and suppose every opponent bids times its valuation. For a deviation , winning means that every opposing value is less than . Independence gives winning probability , so the type- expected utility isFor its derivative isFor it is positive before and negative after; for , every positive bid has nonpositive utility and zero is optimal. Thus the maximum on is . A bid above wins with probability one but gives , which is no better than the already considered endpoint , hence no better than . Ties have probability zero under the continuous opposing distributions. All admissible deviations are therefore covered.
Each bidder's best response is the proposed rule, provingIts conditional expected utility is . With only one bidder, bidding zero is optimal and agrees with the same formal rule; the derivative argument is needed only for .
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2006 iii Paper 38 4 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
The SIPV model concerns a fixed number of bidders competing for one object. Each bidder knows their own private valuation; the value of winning depends on that valuation alone. Valuations are independent random variables with the same atomless distribution , known to everyone, and bidders have identical roles and access to the same strategies. The standard revenue equivalence setting also assumes risk neutrality, quasilinear utility, and noncooperative bidding: expected utility is valuation times winning probability minus expected payment.
The revenue equivalence theorem states that auctions with the same equilibrium allocation probability for each type and the same expected utility for the lowest type have the same expected payment by each type, and therefore the same expected seller revenue. In particular, if the object goes to the highest valuation and the lowest type has zero expected utility, then all such auctions have the same expected revenue. In a strictly increasing symmetric equilibrium, .
For a bidder of valuation , the profit as a function of winning probability is . At an interior stationary point ,The chain rule then gives the first two identities:Integrating from zero and using integration by parts gives the interim payment identityWith the usual zero-payment normalization , this becomesStationarity alone does not determine the integration constant: a fixed participation fee would add that constant. The stated formula uses the lowest-type normalization from revenue equivalence.
For the lowest-price auction with independent uniform distributions on , consider the symmetric increasing equilibrium, so that . The zero type can bid zero, lose almost surely, and pay nothing. The interim payment identity therefore yieldsSum this expected payment over the bidders and average over their uniform distributions:This uses , as appropriate for this auction format.
For three bidders, assume the common bid is with . If a bidder deviates to , , they win precisely when both opposing valuations are below . On that event they pay , so their expected payment and profit areFor , stationarity at gives , henceThis is a global best response, not merely a stationary point: for , is positive for and negative for . Any bid above gives the same sure-win payment as and cannot improve the payoff.
The uniform lowest-price auction equilibrium also verifies the revenue calculation constructively for any . If opponents bid , a deviation to has profitThus is optimal and is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The realized price is times the minimum valuation; this order statistic has expectation , giving the same expected revenue.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2015 iii Paper 42 1 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-06
Use the usual independent private values model, quasilinear utility, and voluntary participation with zero outside utility. These assumptions matter: without individual rationality, arbitrary type-independent entry charges make revenue unbounded, and correlated types cannot in general be described by their marginal priors alone.
The revelation principle lets us optimize over direct revelation mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility. Write for the common project allocation, for player 's interim allocation, and for its interim payment. The interim payment identity givesSince interim individual rationality requires , the virtual-surplus revenue identity bounds expected revenue byThe best feasible common allocation at each valuation profile therefore provides the project when total virtual surplus is nonnegative:Because each regular prior has a nondecreasing virtual valuation, this allocation is a nondecreasing function of each player's report. Hold fixed and charge the critical-value paymentThis is the winning threshold when it lies in the support, the lowest allowed value if every type wins, and zero if the player loses. A truthful winner never pays more than its value; a losing type cannot profit by crossing the threshold. Thus the mechanism has dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality, with zero utility at every lowest type. It attains the revenue bound, proving optimality even among mechanisms requiring only Bayesian incentive compatibility. At a zero-virtual-surplus tie, choose any fixed rule that preserves monotonicity.
For independent uniform distributions on , the virtual valuations are . The revenue-optimal public-project auction becomesWhen it is provided, player paysotherwise every payment is zero. If the displayed threshold exceeds one, player cannot induce provision within its allowed support; if it is negative, provision is independent of its own report and its payment is zero. For , this specializes to a reserve value and payment of .
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2015 iii Paper 42 2 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-06
Assume the usual continuous nonnegative valuation distribution, so ties occur only on zero-probability events. Put . In a monotone symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a type is first with probability and second with probability . Its rank-order expected prize allocation in is thereforeThe all-pay effort identity gives . It also verifies equilibrium directly: a type imitating type has utility , whose derivative is , so the true type is a best response.
In the first version of , the two contests have expected allocationsThere is no common effort budget, and quasilinear utility makes the two effort choices separable. Since , adding their all-pay effort identities yieldsThe equality holds type by type for aggregate effort, rather than only after taking expectations. The within-player correlation of the two efforts does not enter these additive expected payoffs.
For the second version of , let denote descending order statistics. The expected effort in a rank-order contest with prize vector isEquivalently, decompose the allocation into a unit award to the best player and a unit award to each of the best two players, then use revenue equivalence: the corresponding total auction payments are and . Two separate first-place contests with prize values one and two instead generateConsequentlyFor a nondegenerate continuous distribution, the inequality is strict. No regularity of virtual valuations is needed for this comparison. With a uniform distribution on , the two totals are and , giving a difference of .
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2016 iii Paper 212 6 Solution Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-06
Use the standard risk-neutral quasilinear utility model: utility is value received minus payment. A bidder may abstain for utility zero, payments to the seller are nonnegative, and the zero-value type has utility zero. The last normalization is necessary for the requested revenue formula; if arbitrary subsidies were allowed, an additive payment constant would remain undetermined. The independent private values model is symmetric, and each bidder has a unit-demand valuation in the two-item part. Participation satisfies individual rationality.
Let be the interim probability of receiving an item and the interim expected payment of a type . Write . By mimicking the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid of a type , a type could obtain utility . Equilibrium therefore gives, for ,The lower inequality uses type 's incentive constraint, and the upper uses type 's. Since is continuous in these auctions, the inequalities give . With ,This is the interim payment identity underlying revenue equivalence.
For one item, independence and the uniform distribution give : all other values must be below . Hence the expected payment from a bidder conditional on its value isThis is an unconditional-in-winning interim payment, not the amount paid conditional on winning. In the first-price sealed-bid auction, , so the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid iswith . For , the seller's revenue is zero and a zero bid suffices under the stipulated allocation rule.
For two items and three unit-demand bidders, a type wins if at most one of the other two values exceeds it. ThereforeThe interim payment identity gives . Dividing by the winning probability gives the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidTo check that this is an Bayesian Nash equilibrium rather than just a necessary formula, its derivative is , positive for . A type mimicking a type receives utility , whose derivative in is . It is positive before and negative after it, so the truthful type-matching bid is globally optimal. Bids above the highest Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid can only increase payment without increasing the winning probability; the usual nonnegative bid range covers the lower boundary.
By symmetry and the law of total expectation, the seller's expected two-item revenue isFor one item and the same three bidders,More generally the single-item revenue with bidders is . Allocating a second item lowers competition enough that it adds no expected revenue in this particular three-bidder uniform model.
The final mechanism is a direct revelation mechanism because the message submitted by bidder is its valuation report, in the same type space , and allocation and payment are explicit functions of those reports. It is the Clarke pivot mechanism for selecting two unit-demand winners. Truthful reporting is a dominant strategy: bidder 's utility equals its true allocation value plus the other bidders' reported allocation values, minus a term depending only on the others' reports. Reporting its true value makes the efficient allocation maximize the first two terms, while the last is unaffected by its report.
Let the ordered values be . For a winner , the maximum welfare achievable by the other two bidders is their combined value; in the actual allocation only the other winner receives an item. Thus the difference defining its payment is the excluded bidder's value . For the loser, both other bidders receive items already, so its payment is zero. Consequently both winners pay the lowest valuation, andThis equals the first-price sealed-bid auction revenue above. A conditional check gives the same interim payment identity: the minimum of the other two values has density , and bidder wins exactly when that minimum is below . Its conditional expected pivot payment is . The mechanisms have equal expected revenue, even though their realized payments need not coincide.
Risk neutrality 2026-10-06
Risk neutrality means evaluating uncertain monetary gains by their expected value. For auction payment identities, quasilinear utility gives a bidder's expected utility as its value times its winning probability minus expected payment.
Simultaneous all-pay contests 2026-10-06
Players choose efforts in several all-pay contests at the same time. With additive quasilinear utility and no shared effort budget, a player's expected payoff is the sum of its per-contest payoffs. An entry restriction couples the choices of contests even though the subsequent effort optimization is separable.
Single-parameter mechanism 2026-10-06
In a single-parameter mechanism, player has one private scalar value , receives an allocation amount , and has quasilinear utility . The allocation-payment relation is governed by incentive compatibility and the interim payment identity.
Symmetric independent private values model 2026-10-14
The independent private values model is symmetric when bidders have identical roles and draw their valuations independently from the same distribution. For revenue equivalence in the usual single-object setting, bidders additionally have risk neutrality and quasilinear utility. Under a strictly increasing symmetric equilibrium bidding rule, a type wins with probability .
// Target: mathematical-optimization.bigb
Vickrey auction 2026-10-14
A single-item auction in which the highest bidder wins and pays the highest competing bid. Under private values and quasilinear utility, bidding one's valuation is a dominant strategy: if the competing maximum is below one's value, winning at that price is best; if it is above one's value, losing is best; equality gives zero utility either way. Thus truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism 2026-10-06
The pivot form chooses a reported-welfare-maximizing allocation and charges each agent the maximum welfare achievable by the others without that agent minus the others' welfare in the chosen allocation. With quasilinear utility, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy because the first term in the payment depends only on other reports. For two identical items and three unit-demand bidders, each winner pays the lowest reported valuation and the loser pays zero.