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A researcher in metacognition who proposed that subjective confidence depends on the consistency of evidence supporting an answer. In his self-consistency model, people can confidently choose a wrong answer when the accessible evidence consistently favors it. This separates the mechanism producing confidence from the external criterion used to judge its accuracy.^[ref]

A benefit can explain why a capacity is retained without showing that every occurrence is beneficial. Mind-wandering can support internally generated plans or new associations while competing with the external task. Explaining its prevalence requires comparing those possible gains with attention, monitoring and opportunity costs across contexts; prevalence alone is not evidence that natural selection optimized the observed frequency.

Benjamin Baird and colleagues used an incubation effect design with unusual-use problems. Between attempts, participants performed an undemanding task, a demanding task, rested, or had no break. The undemanding condition improved later performance on previously encountered problems and was associated with more reported mind wandering.^[ref] This supports a contextual benefit of a condition permitting mind wandering. Because the manipulation also changes external demands and other aspects of processing, it does not by itself show that each reported wandering episode caused the improvement, or that an unmonitored episode is better than a monitored one.

Costs are independently important. Smartphone experience sampling associated off-task thought with lower reported happiness.^[ref] Such observations concern everyday experience but are not randomized assignments to thought content. They cannot settle every causal direction or establish that all forms of internal thought have the same effect. Laboratory work separately distinguished mind wandering with and without meta-awareness, relating unrecognized episodes to failures of response inhibition in a word-encoding and target-detection task.^[ref] Thus a potentially useful change in thought content and a failure to notice that change should not be treated as one phenomenon.

An adaptive account can be formulated as a resource-allocation model. Continuously verifying attention has a cost; internally directed processing may have delayed value when current external demands are low. A policy that sometimes permits drift can outperform one that prevents every diversion. However, this is a conditional argument. It predicts that benefits depend on task importance, timing and the ability to return to the task. It does not establish that the actual policy is optimal, or that lapses during safety-critical activity are advantageous.

Other apparent failures require the same discipline. In self-consistency theory of confidence, relying on a fast consistency cue can be economical in an environment where consistent answers tend to be correct. Systematic misinformation can break that relation and produce confident errors.^[ref] Similarly, an imperfect judgment of learning might be cheaper than continually testing every item, but an observed illusion is not automatically a useful bias. One must compare it with feasible alternative policies under the same costs and show an actual benefit, rather than inventing a beneficial purpose after observing the error.

A convincing test would manipulate context and monitoring opportunity, separately measure intentionality and awareness, and assess both the current task and later benefits. It should distinguish immediate experimental utility, long-run learned adaptation and an evolutionary history. Benefits can explain some mind wandering and economical monitoring policies; they do not justify a universal adaptive explanation of metacognitive failure.

Confidence inferred from agreement among sampled representations supporting a response. Internally consistent evidence can systematically favour a wrong answer, separating confidence from correctness.^[ref]