Use the preceding fixed point with $q=\perp$. If the chosen arithmetic interpretation sends $\perp$ to a PA-refutable sentence $Z$, it gives the arithmetic sentenceThis follows from Arithmetical soundness of GL. Since Peano arithmetic proves $\neg Z$, the two implications are equivalent to negated provability:Thus $C$ expresses the formal consistency statement for Peano arithmetic and is also a negative provability fixed point, like its Gödel sentence $G$.

Apply the supplied modal uniqueness formula to the context with a modalized occurrence $X(p)=(\square p\to \perp )$, with two fresh variables interpreted as $G$ and $C$. A modalized occurrence means that each indicated variable occurrence lies inside a box. Peano arithmetic proves both arithmetic fixed-point equations. The first derivability condition boxes those equations, so the translated uniqueness formula givesOne must not infer $G\leftrightarrow C$ by reflection. Instead, distribution and the provability of the two propositional projections give $\mathrm{PA}⊢BG\leftrightarrow BC$. Negating and using the two fixed-point equations now yieldsThis proves the Equivalence of a Gödel sentence and a consistency statement using the required modal soundness, fixed point and uniqueness results.

Take $Y(p)=p\to q$ and put $\top =(\perp \to \perp )$, $H=Y(\top )$ and $F_0=Y(\square H)=\square H\to q$. The first supplied substitution identity readsUse the supplied replacement of equivalents in the context $D(p)=p\to q$. It givesBut $H=(\top \to q)$ is equivalent to $q$. Replacement under a box gives $\square H\leftrightarrow \square q$, so $F_0$ is equivalent toReplacing equivalents once more transfers the fixed-point equation to $F$, proving $\mathrm{GL}⊢F\leftrightarrow (\square F\to q)$.

A direct check of this GL fixed point for a provability implication is useful: the Löb axiom gives $\square F\to \square q$, and necessitating the tautology $q\to F$ gives $\square q\to \square F$ by $\mathrm{K}$. Thus $\square F\leftrightarrow \square q$, and replacing the antecedent in $\square F\to q$ recovers $F$.

Induct on a derivation in Gödel-Löb logic. Propositional axiom instances translate to theorems of Peano arithmetic. The image of $\perp$ is a refutable sentence, so it behaves as falsity in those translated propositional arguments.

The translation of axiom $\mathrm{K}$ is the distribution clause of the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions. The translation of axiom $\mathrm{L}$ isthe Internal form of Löb's theorem, whose derivation was given above and applies to the stipulated arithmetical provability predicate for Peano arithmetic. Thus every axiom has a provable translation.

The modus ponens rule is preserved because the interpretation commutes with implication. The necessitation rule is preserved by the first derivability condition: if $\mathrm{PA}⊢{\mathcal{I}}_i(A)$, thenHere the equality denotes the definition of the translated formula, not an arithmetic equality of truth values. A propositional substitution merely changes the arithmetic sentences assigned to the variables. The induction proves the Arithmetical soundness of GL:

The Gödel-Löb logic $\mathrm{GL}$ uses propositional variables, $\perp$, implication, and a unary modal operator $\square$. Other Boolean connectives are abbreviations; for example $\neg A$ means $A\to \perp$ and $\top$ means $\perp \to \perp$.

Its axioms are all classical propositional tautologies and the two schemesIts rules are the modus ponens rule and the necessitation rule, $\mathrm{GL}⊢A\Rightarrow \mathrm{GL}⊢\square A$. Uniform propositional substitution is allowed, or equivalently built into the axiom schemes. necessitation rule applies to theorems; a temporary assumption cannot simply be boxed. In provability logic, $\square A$ is read as the formal assertion that $A$ is provable.

Put $T=S+\{X\}$ and choose its Gödel sentence $Z$, so $T⊢Z\leftrightarrow \neg B_{T}Z$. The assumed reflection scheme gives the particular theoremThe given extension-provability implication is $S⊢B_{T}Z\to B_S(X\to Z)$. The fixed-point equivalence gives $T⊢\neg Z\to B_{T}Z$, so these implications compose toThe supplied propositional tautology $((\neg Z\to (X\to Z))\to (X\to Z))$ gives $T⊢X\to Z$, and $T⊢X$ then yields $T⊢Z$. The first of the derivability conditions for $T$ gives $T⊢B_{T}Z$, while its Gödel equivalence gives $T⊢\neg B_{T}Z$. Hence $T$ is inconsistent. By the deduction theorem for propositional logic,This proof uses diagonalization and proof transfer for the extension, and invokes neither Löb's theorem nor the second incompleteness theorem.

Use just the assumed local reflection instance with $Y=\neg X$:By the deduction theorem for propositional logic, $S⊢X\to (B_S(\neg X)\to \neg X)$. Classical propositional logic makes this imply the unconditional reflection statement $S⊢B_S(\neg X)\to \neg X$: if $X$ is false the consequent is already true, and if $X$ is true the displayed implication supplies it. Löb's theorem applied to $\neg X$ now givesThus full local reflection in a one-sentence extension is inconsistent; in this argument even the single instance concerning $\neg X$ suffices.