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Gödel's completeness theorem for first-order sentences says that, in a standard sound first-order Hilbert calculus,Equivalently every first-order consistent set of first-order sentences has a first-order model: apply this existence statement to $T\cup \{\neg \sigma \}$ for the consequence formulation.

For the first-order model existence formal proof use a Henkin construction. Enlarge the language by fresh constant symbols and adjoin Henkin witness axiomsFreshness of $c_{\theta }$ preserves first-order consistency. In detail, if a contradiction followed after adjoining one witness axiom, the deduction theorem for first-order logic would yield its negation, from which one obtains both $\exists x\theta (x)$ and $\neg \theta (c_{\theta })$ over the old theory. Since the new constant symbol does not occur in that theory or in $\theta$, replace it by a fresh logical variable and generalize to derive $\forall x\neg \theta (x)$, a contradiction. Finitely many witness additions preserve first-order consistency successively, and unions preserve first-order consistency because formal proofs are finite. Iterate the enlargement so that logical formulas involving newly introduced constant symbols also receive witnesses. Include at least one constant symbol to guarantee closed terms.

Extend the resulting first-order consistent witnessed first-order theory to a maximal consistent set of first-order sentences $H$. In the equality-free case make the domain the set of closed terms. Interpret constant symbols and function symbols by their formal first-order term constructions; interpret an atomic formula byThe truth lemma for a Henkin term model follows by induction on logical formulas with closed terms substituted for their free variables. The logical connective steps use maximal consistency of a first-order theory. In the existential step, membership of $\exists x\theta$ supplies a witness constant and hence a first-order term satisfying $\theta$; conversely a satisfying closed term gives the existential sentence by an inference of the calculus. The term model consequently satisfies $H$ and the original theory. Equality is absent here, so distinct closed terms may remain distinct domain elements without further identifications.

For each term $t$ define an $L_2$-formula $E_t(z)$ expressing its value. Use fresh bound variables at every step:Freshness includes avoiding all relevant free variables of the formula being translated. Define the atomic translation byand extend through the logical operations: $\sigma (\neg \theta )=\neg \sigma (\theta )$, $\sigma (\theta \to \eta )=\sigma (\theta )\to \sigma (\eta )$, and $\sigma (\forall x\theta )=\forall x\sigma (\theta )$. Fresh witnesses prevent variable capture and ensure the translation preserves the original free-variable set.

For an $L_1$-structure $A$, let $A^r$ have the graph relation of $f^A$ and singleton relation $\{c^A\}$. Induction on terms proves that $E_t(z)$ holds precisely when $z$ is the value of $t$. Induction on formulas then provesConversely every $L_2$-structure satisfying $\varphi ,\psi$ is uniquely the relational version of an $L_1$-structure on that same domain. Hence, for arbitrary possibly infinite $\Gamma$, semantic entailment on the left is equivalent to semantic entailment from $\sigma (\Gamma )\cup \{\varphi ,\psi \}$ on the right, with assignments retained in the free-formula case. Applying soundness theorem for first-order logic and Gödel's completeness theorem givesThe prohibition on completeness in the preceding direct equality question is local to that proof; here it supplies the clean semantic-to-syntactic transfer after the actual translation and model correspondence have been established.

A set of sentences is satisfiable if some nonempty first-order structure in its language makes every sentence in the set true. Because the formulas are sentences, their truth is independent of the assignment in a first-order structure.

This is a semantic existence condition. Its equivalence with syntactic consistency is the content of the classical Gödel's completeness theorem, together with soundness.

The theory is consistent because the rational order is a model. If some sentence $\theta$ were not decided by the theory, both extensions by $\theta$ and by $\neg \theta$ would be consistent. By Gödel's completeness theorem and the countable-model consequence of Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, each would have a countable model. The two models would disagree on $\theta$, so could not be isomorphic. This contradicts part (iii).

Therefore the theory decides every sentence and is complete. Under the standard convention that a theory includes all its logical consequences, this makes it maximal consistent.

If one takes only the displayed finite list of axioms as a raw set, that list is not literally maximal consistent: one can add further theorems without inconsistency. The conclusion applies to its deductive closure, which is the complete theory of dense linear order without endpoints.

A set of first-order sentences is satisfiable when it has a nonempty structure in which all its sentences are true. Truth of a sentence is independent of assignment in a first-order structure. The soundness theorem for first-order logic gives consistency from satisfiability, and Gödel's completeness theorem gives the converse for the standard classical deductive system.