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For a simple symmetric random walk starting at zero, let $T_1$ be its first hitting time of $1$. The infinite mean first passage of a simple symmetric random walk shows that $T_1<\infty$ almost surely but $\mathbb{E}[T_1]=\infty$. Since $S_{T_1}=1$, assuming a finite expected value for $T_1$ would let Wald's equation assert $1=0\mathbb{E}[T_1]=0$, a contradiction. The formal expression $0\cdot \infty$ is not an allowed use of the theorem.^[ref]

Compare $T_{\pm 2}=\inf \{n\ge 0:|S_n|=2\}$. From every surviving position in $\{-1,0,1\}$, three consecutive positive increments force absorption within three steps. Each fresh block has probability $1/8$ of this event, so $\mathbb{P}(T_{\pm 2}>3k)\le (7/8{)}^k$ and $\mathbb{E}[T_{\pm 2}]\le 24$. This establishes finiteness before invoking the theorem. If $e_j$ is the average remaining time from position $j$, the law of total expectation givesso $\mathbb{E}[T_{\pm 2}]=4$. Symmetry gives equal exit probabilities at $-2$ and $2$, and $\mathbb{E}[S_{T_{\pm 2}}]=0$, as Wald's equation predicts. This is a small gambler's ruin problem with two absorbing barriers.

Even for $T_1$, each bounded stopping time $T_1\wedge n$ satisfies $\mathbb{E}[S_{T_1\wedge n}]=0$. The stopped process tends to $1$ almost surely, but its expected value does not tend to $1$. Rare long negative excursions retain the balancing contribution. The existing stopped-walk martingale with almost sure but not L1 convergence explains the related failure of uniform integrability; almost sure convergence alone does not permit exchanging a limit and an expected value.

Let $X_1,X_2$ be independent fair signs, each taking $-1$ and $1$ with equal probability. Set $N=1$ if $X_2=1$, and $N=2$ if $X_2=-1$. Deciding whether $N\le 1$ requires the second sign, so $N$ is not a stopping time for the natural filtration. The four equally likely possibilities giveBoth the increments and the count are bounded, but the identity fails because the second contribution is retained only when it is negative. This is selection using an unobserved outcome, rather than a legitimate sequential decision. Boundedness alone cannot replace the stopping time hypothesis.^[ref]