Shapley wages in an entrepreneur-worker game ($w=\frac{1}{n(n+1)}{\sum }_{k=0}^{n-1}(k+1)(p(k+1)-p(k))$)

An entrepreneur is indispensable and a coalition containing the entrepreneur and $k$ of $n$ workers earns $p(k)$; a coalition without the entrepreneur earns zero. A worker's marginal contribution is nonzero only when the entrepreneur precedes them. The probability that the entrepreneur and exactly $k$ other workers precede that worker is $(k+1)/(n(n+1))$, giving the displayed common Shapley value wage. The entrepreneur receives $p(n)-nw$. Convex nondecreasing $p$ makes all marginal contributions increase with predecessor sets, so the whole Shapley value allocation belongs to the core.