Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge / 2009 / iii / Paper 53 / 4 / A

A secure key can be produced, at one ideal secret bit per copy. The shared Bell state is pure, so the preceding factorization shows that Eve's purifying system is independent of it. Measuring both qubits in the computational basis gives matching outcomes $00$ or $11$, each with probability $1/2$. Neither party announces these key outcomes. Eve's state is the same for both possibilities, so each copy supplies a shared uniform private bit.

The normalized ray produces a secure key; the literal printed vector is not normalized. The squared norm of the coefficients in the PDF is $8/9+1/81=73/81$. Thus the physical pure state on that ray has normalized coefficients $6\sqrt{2}/\sqrt{73}$ and $1/\sqrt{73}$. This is a genuine entangled state with two nonzero Schmidt coefficients, and Eve is independent of it by purity decouples a subsystem from its purification.

For an explicit way to obtain uniform key bits, Alice applies a two-outcome local measurement in quantum mechanics with Kraus operatorsTheir squared products sum to the identity. The successful unnormalized state is $(|00⟩+|11⟩)/\sqrt{73}$, soAlice announces only success or failure. Success leaves an exact Bell pair, yielding one uniform secret bit; failure leaves $|00⟩$ and is discarded. With many copies the successful fraction is positive. Alternatively, direct computational basis measurements give a shared biased bit with probabilities $72/73$ and $1/73$, from which privacy amplification can extract uniform secret bits. The coefficient $1/9$ has not been silently replaced by $1/3$.

No secure key can be produced from this state alone. Factoring the printed amplitudes gives the normalized product stateEve is uncorrelated with the joint pure state, but Alice and Bob also have no correlations with each other: local outcome probabilities factor. They may generate independent private random bits locally, but local operations and classical communication cannot make those bits shared and secret using only public messages. A product state supplies no shared secret resource.

No secure key can be produced. The off-diagonal terms in the two Bell state projectors cancel, giving the separable quantum stateA possible purification of a density operator is $(|00{⟩}_{AB}|0{⟩}_E+|11{⟩}_{AB}|1{⟩}_E)/\sqrt{2}$. Eve measures her register in the computational basis and learns whether Alice and Bob have $00$ or $11$. Their apparently shared random bit is therefore completely known to Eve. Conditioned on her record the Alice–Bob state is a known product state; public discussion and local private randomness cannot create a shared secret unknown to that record. The state has no distillable secret key in the stated purification model.

A secure key can be produced, at one ideal secret bit per copy. Denote Alice's additional flag qubit by $F$. Alice can measure $F$ in the computational basis and, when its outcome is $1$, apply the Pauli Z gate to her half of the shared pair. The two flag outcomes each have probability $1/2$, and $Z_A|{\Phi }^{-}⟩=|{\Phi }^{+}⟩$; either branch therefore supplies the same pure Bell pair.

Equivalently, Alice applies the local controlled unitaryThis local flag correction of a Bell-state phase mixture changes the full density matrix intoThe corrected pair is pure, so every purification factors between $AB$ and $FE$. Eve may know the flag without knowing the key bit obtained from $AB$. Alice need not disclose the flag, but even disclosing it does not compromise the corrected pure Bell pair. Tracing out the flag before correction would give the nonprivate mixture in the preceding case; retaining Alice's local side information is essential.