The succinct input is the players' variable-control sets, their goal propositional formulas, and a complete candidate Boolean valuation; an exponentially expanded payoff matrix is not part of the input. This representation is essential to candidate equilibrium checking in a Boolean game.
For membership in co-NP, consider the complement: the candidate is not a Nash equilibrium. A complexity certificate consists of a player and an alternative Boolean valuation of that player's controlled Boolean variables. Evaluate the current goal and the goal after this unilateral deviation, keeping every other player's variables fixed. A profitable unilateral deviation exists precisely when the current goal is false and the new goal is true. The certificate has at most the number of input variables plus the player index, and both propositional formula evaluations take polynomial time. Thus the complement belongs to NP, and the original decision problem belongs to co-NP.
For hardness, start with a propositional formula and introduce a fresh Boolean variable . Construct a one-player Boolean game in which that player controls and has goal
Choose the candidate pure strategy assigning every variable false. Its payoff is zero because is false, regardless of . If has a satisfying assignment, changing to that assignment and to true is a profitable unilateral deviation. If is an unsatisfiable Boolean formula, no unilateral deviation can satisfy the goal. Therefore
The construction increases the formula length by only a constant and writes a candidate of linear length, so it is a polynomial-time many-one reduction. Unsatisfiability is co-NP-complete; combining hardness and membership proves that candidate Nash equilibrium checking for Boolean games is co-NP-complete. If a convention requires at least two players, add a player controlling a fresh unused variable and having the always-true goal; this changes neither direction of the proof.

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