Candidate equilibrium checking in a Boolean game ($\mathrm{coNP}\text{-complete}$)

Given a succinct Boolean game and a complete pure strategy strategy profile, determine whether it is a Nash equilibrium. The problem is co-NP-complete for goal propositional formulas, even with one player. This differs from existential equilibrium checking in a Boolean game, which searches for some qualifying Nash equilibrium.

A negative instance has a short complexity certificate: a currently unsatisfied player and new truth values for that player's controlled Boolean variables that make the goal true. Evaluating the current and changed propositional formulas takes polynomial time, proving membership in co-NP.

For hardness, given a propositional formula $F(X)$, let one player control $X$ and a fresh variable $z$, with goal $z\wedge F(X)$. The all-false candidate has payoff zero. It is a Nash equilibrium exactly when $F$ is an unsatisfiable Boolean formula, since any satisfying assignment permits an improvement by also setting $z$ true. This is a polynomial-time many-one reduction from unsatisfiability. The fresh guard ensures that the candidate loses independently of the input formula's value there.