Boolean game

A finite game represented succinctly by propositional logic. Each player controls a disjoint collection of Boolean variables and chooses their truth values. Together those choices determine a Boolean valuation. A player's goal is a propositional formula, with payoff one if satisfied and zero otherwise. The control sets normally form a set partition of all variables.

A pure strategy strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if every unsatisfied player remains unsatisfied after every change to that player's controlled variables. Checking a candidate can therefore require solving a Boolean satisfiability problem, even though evaluating its current payoffs is easy.

Given a succinct Boolean game and a complete pure strategy strategy profile, determine whether it is a Nash equilibrium. The problem is co-NP-complete for goal propositional formulas, even with one player. This differs from existential equilibrium checking in a Boolean game, which searches for some qualifying Nash equilibrium.

A negative instance has a short complexity certificate: a currently unsatisfied player and new truth values for that player's controlled Boolean variables that make the goal true. Evaluating the current and changed propositional formulas takes polynomial time, proving membership in co-NP.

For hardness, given a propositional formula $F(X)$, let one player control $X$ and a fresh variable $z$, with goal $z\wedge F(X)$. The all-false candidate has payoff zero. It is a Nash equilibrium exactly when $F$ is an unsatisfiable Boolean formula, since any satisfying assignment permits an improvement by also setting $z$ true. This is a polynomial-time many-one reduction from unsatisfiability. The fresh guard ensures that the candidate loses independently of the input formula's value there.