The selection's opening identifies the original 1959 text and its later editorial arrangement. Sections 29–30 of the full book distinguish acceptance of basic statements from conclusive justification; sections 82–84 discuss scientific corroboration. An indexed full-text transcription is fliphtml5.com/jbdh/wxak/The_Logic_of_Scientific_Discovery_%28Popper_2002%29/ .
Primary book scan. Chapter III, section 4, pp. 72–80 in the fourth edition, defines grue through examination before a cutoff; chapter IV develops predicate entrenchment and projectibility. The original definition does not require an already examined green object to change colour at the cutoff.
Primary paper, PSA 1982, volume 2, pp. 669–688; the scanned publication carries 1983 copyright. The discussion distinguishes local translation difficulties from interpretation and learning a conceptual vocabulary. The chemical example connects phlogiston, element and principle.
Original article, Philosophical Topics 13(1), 1982, pp. 71–87. The opening distinguishes experimental entities used as tools from belief in the truth of whole theories. A related chapter appears in the 1983 book Representing and Intervening; its pagination is different.
Chapter 4 of Mathematics, Matter and Method, pp. 60–78; printed p. 73 gives the realist argument from scientific success. The chapter appeared in the 1975 collection; the linked publisher record is for the 1979 second edition and its later online publication. The similarly named short Historia Mathematica item is not silently substituted.
Original article scan: liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
Original essay text, reproduced in its revised collected form: Institutionally hosted text. Sections I–IV challenge proposed explanations of analyticity; sections V–VI address reductionism and the wider system tested by experience.
Publisher record and synopsis. Author's book page. Chapter 2 introduces constructive empiricism; the publisher's synopsis explicitly distinguishes literal theoretical language, empirical adequacy and theory acceptance.
Chapter 3 of Theory and Evidence. Institutionally hosted scan of the chapter. The old-evidence/new-theory discussion concerns the inability of ordinary conditioning on already certain evidence to represent its newly recognized support for a theory.
Original text of section IV: Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding. Parts I–II distinguish demonstrative reasoning from inference beyond experience and examine the circular appeal to past success.
Publisher record for part II, chapter VI, Physical Theory and Experiment. Searchable chapter scan. Section 2 concerns testing a theoretical group rather than an isolated hypothesis.
Scan of the original article. Section 3 states the deductive schema and adequacy conditions; the original article explicitly restricts its developed analysis to deductive explanation.
Open University archive record. Preserved print of the LSE transcript, including its notice identifying later additions. The original LSE transcript URL now returns 404.
Author-hosted article. Section II discusses instrumental detection; section III distinguishes acceptance and belief.
Author-uploaded draft of the chapter in Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Sections 0.0–0.1 state the account of property clusters and explanatory classification.
First author: Thomas Nagel. The Philosophical Review 83, pp. 435–450, especially pp. 439–442: subjective standpoint versus objective description.
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